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BULK BIOMETRIC METADATA COLLECTION*
MARGARET HU**
Smart police body cameras and smart glasses worn by law
enforcement increasingly reflect state-of-the-art surveillance
technology, such as the integration of live-streaming video with
facial recognition and artificial intelligence tools, including
automated analytics. This Article explores how these emerging
cybersurveillance technologies risk the potential for bulk
biometric metadata collection. Such collection is likely to fall
outside the scope of the types of bulk metadata collection
protections regulated by the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The
USA FREEDOM Act was intended to bring the practice of bulk
telephony metadata collection conducted by the National
Security Agency (“NSA”) under tighter regulation. In the wake
of the disclosures by Edward Snowden in June 2013, members of
Congress called for statutory reform to eliminate or significantly
curtail indiscriminate metadata surveillance of United States
citizens. The Snowden revelations illuminated that the bulk
telephony metadata collection program had been legally justified
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This Article
contends that the USA FREEDOM Act, which amended Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, does not restrict other types of
non-telephony bulk metadata collection. This Article concludes
that, rather than more tightly regulating metadata surveillance,
the Act allows for metadata surveillance to proceed under
differing justifications and in more delegated contexts. The
potential of ubiquitous and continuous data collection and
analysis that may stem from smart body cameras or smart glasses
worn by law enforcement offers an important case study on why
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the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric
metadata collection.
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INTRODUCTION
In the contemporary market, police body cameras are generally
understood to be first-generation technologies that execute onedimensional surveillance capacities.1 For example, most police body
cameras available on the market are currently designed to store the
audio-video recording of images captured in average definition
through manual operation, subject to data storage limitations.2 Yet, a

1. A great deal of important scholarship has been produced on the legal and policy
consequences of police body cameras in recent years. See, e.g., Kami N. Chavis, BodyWorn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and
Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 987–89
(2016); Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68
ALA. L. REV. 395, 397–401 (2016).
2. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901 (2017) (“Small enough to be worn on the head, ear, or chest, a
body camera can go everywhere officers go, providing audiovisual recording of what
officers see, hear and do.”) (citing NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN
CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (2012), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-BodyWorn-Cameras-508.pdf [http://perma.cc/3PYS-EL9M]). Body-worn cameras have been
defined as “a small audio-video recorder with the singular purpose of recording
audio/visual files, specifically designed to be mounted on a person.” Id. at 901 n.15 (citing
S.F. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS POLICY, RECOMMENDED DRAFT 1 (2015),
http://sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/27674-BWC%20VERSION
%201.pdf [http://perma.cc/4VM3-U6RW]).
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next generation of smart police body cameras increasingly attempt to
integrate live-streaming video with facial recognition and other
artificial intelligence tools, such as automated analytics and database
screening capacities.3 Similarly, smart glasses, if and when they are
worn by law enforcement on a broad scale, will have the potential to
facilitate a wide range of data sensor and analytic capacities.4
Consequently, the emerging cybersurveillance capacities of smart
police body cameras and smart glasses are not fully appreciated.5 This
Article explores how these technologies facilitate biometric
6
cybersurveillance through the capture and storage of biometric data
such as facial images.7 According to one study, digital images of 117

3. See, e.g., Alex Pasternack, Police Body Cameras Will Do More Than Just Record
You, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3061935/police-bodycameras-livestreaming-face-recognition-and-ai [http://perma.cc/8NLQ-L3M].
4. See, e.g., Jeremy Hsu, Face of the Future: How Facial-Recognition Tech Will
Change Everything, NBC NEWS (June 11, 2013, 4:49 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id
/52172415/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/face-future-how-facial-recognition
-tech-will-change-everything/#.WpGZ0e7wZjQ
[http://perma.cc/CY8L-NBJK];
Jon
Russell, Chinese Police are Using Smart Glasses to Identify Potential Suspects,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 8, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/08/chinese-police-aregetting-smart-glasses/ [http://perma.cc/2RLZ-6X4A].
5. For other important scholarship on surveillance, see, for example, Julie Cohen,
What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1931 (2013) (asserting that “[p]rotection
against government surveillance is necessary if we are to avoid an Orwellian surveillance
society”); Ashley S. Deeks, Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 VA. L. REV.
599, 617 (2016) (“Other [governmental] activities stimulate far more concern, however,
particularly when those activities directly implicate the life, liberty, and privacy of
individuals not associated with governments. The recent [Snowden] leaks have
illustrated—in ways that startled the general public—the prevalence today of that latter
type of activity.”); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth
Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J.
527, 528 (2017) (“Where law enforcement is involved, these powerful new technologies
also raise questions about how their use can be harmonized with the U.S. Constitution.”);
Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1934 (2013)
(“Although we have laws that protect us against government surveillance, secret
government programs cannot be challenged until they are discovered. And even when
they are, our law of surveillance provides only minimal protections.”).
6. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1477 n.3;
see also id. at 1480 n.15 (defining cybersurveillance as “the process by which some form of
human activity is analyzed by a computer according to some specified rule. . . . [T]he
critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting data for some
follow-up review by some human.” (quoting LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at
209 (2006)).
7. The Current and Future Applications of Biometric Technologies: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Research & Subcomm. on Tech. Comm. On Sci., Space and Tech.,
113th Cong. 16 (2013) [hereinafter Romine Testimony] (statement of Charles H. Romine,
Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and
Technology) (“Biometric technologies can provide a means for uniquely recognizing
humans based upon one or more physical or behavioral characteristics and can be used to
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million individuals, criminals and non-criminals, are already stored in
a searchable federal, state, or local database.8 What may be less
understood, however, is how biometric data collection also includes
“associated metadata [collection]—information about the biometric
characteristics or how [the biometric data] was collected.”9 This
Article, therefore, focuses on one risk associated with these emerging
surveillance technologies: the potential for bulk biometric metadata
collection, a practice which is likely to fall outside of the scope of the
types of bulk metadata collection protections regulated by the USA
FREEDOM Act.10
Metadata is data about data, which includes for example the time
of a telephone call or the email addresses of a recipient and sender.11
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 was intended to bring the practice
of bulk telephony metadata collection conducted by the NSA under
tighter regulation.12 In the wake of the disclosures by Edward
establish or verify personal identity of individuals previously enrolled. Examples of
physical characteristics include face photos, fingerprints, and iris images.”).
8. Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up:
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH.
(Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/press-releases/half-of-all-americanadults-are-in-a-police-face-recognition-database-new-report-finds.cfm [http://perma.cc/833XZWQY].
9. New NIST Biometric Data Standard Adds DNA, Footmarks and Enhanced
Fingerprint Descriptions, NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH. (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.nist.gov
/news-events/news/2011/12/new-nist-biometric-data-standard-adds-dna-footmarks-and-enhanced
[https://perma.cc/BW77-8YSW].
10. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at 50
U.S.C. 1801 (2016)).
11. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN., METADATA AND PRIVACY:
A TECHNICAL AND LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2014), https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1786/md
_201410_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXA7-ES6V] (“Simply put, metadata is data that
provides information about other data. It is information that is generated as you use
technology.”).
12. In an early version of the USA FREEDOM Act, the language of the statute
stated the following purpose: “To rein in the dragnet collection of data by the National
Security Agency (NSA) and other government agencies, increase transparency of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), provide businesses the ability to release
information regarding FISA requests, and create an independent constitutional advocate
to argue cases before the FISC.” See Alex Byers, Surveillance Reform Bill Outlined,
POLITICO (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10
/surveillance-reform-bill-outlined-174157 [https://perma.cc/4YDR-VKXS] (quoting USA
FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1599, 113th Cong. (2013)). The
original acronym for the USA FREEDOM Act was Uniting and Strengthening America
by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online
Monitoring Act. Dan Roberts, The USA FREEDOM Act: A Look at the Key Points of the
Draft Bill, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013
/oct/10/the-usa-freedom-act-a-look-at-the-key-points-of-the-draft-bill
[https://perma.cc
/8CN6-ZSSL] (“The bill has a somewhat cumbersome title: [T]he Uniting and
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-
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Snowden in June 2013,13 members of Congress immediately called for
statutory reform to eliminate or significantly curtail indiscriminate
telephony metadata surveillance of U.S. citizens.14 Congressman
James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), former Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee and a sponsor of the Act, explained that the Snowden
disclosures had revealed an intelligence community program that had,
in his opinion, clearly exceeded the boundaries of the intent of the
underlying law that had been used by the NSA to justify it: the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001.15 According to Congressman
Sensenbrenner—one of the original architects of the USA PATRIOT
Act16—the practice of mass, suspicionless collection of the metadata
of every phone call by millions of Verizon subscribers daily for a
period of several years was not within the type of intelligence activity
that had been authorized, or even anticipated, by the USA
Collection and Online Monitoring Act. But it’s one of those pieces of legislation that has
been named for its acronym: the USA FREEDOM Act.”). The USA FREEDOM Act was
modified in House Resolution 2048, sponsored by Congressman Sensenbrenner, to reflect
the following title: “Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act.” Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 1, 129 Stat. at 268.
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-891 (2016); Barton Gellman, Aaron Blake & Greg
Miller, Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, WASH. POST (June 9,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-push-back-on-leakersmedia/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html?utm_term=.8e92cf79c0ed
[https://perma.cc/3E2Z-5S5K].
14. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden, Udall Statement on
the Disclosure of Bulk Email Records Collection Program (July 2, 2013),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-udall-statement-on-the-disclosureof-bulk-email-records-collection-program [https://perma.cc/HJ35-KS84]; Press Release,
Office of Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden and Udall: Intelligence Community’s Response Leaves
Important
Surveillance
Questions
Unanswered
(July
26,
2013),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-and-udall-important-surveillancequestions-unanswered [https://perma.cc/QJ6Q-9Y8E]; Ellen Nakashima, Sen. Patrick
Leahy Calls for End to NSA Bulk Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sen-patrick-leahy-calls-for-end-to
-nsa-bulk-phone-records-program/2013/09/24/85a21f66-252a-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6
_story.html [https://perma.cc/L55Y-BTZE].
15. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
sec. 215, § 501, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). See
Matt Fuller, Sensenbrenner Slams NSA to European Parliament, ROLL CALL (Nov. 11,
2013, 11:55 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/218/sensenbrenner-slams-nsa-to-europeanparliament [https://perma.cc/24AC-TUXU]; Jim Sensenbrenner, NSA Abused Trust, Must
Be Reined in, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/news
/opinion/nsa-abused-trust-must-be-reined-in-b99131601z1-230292131.html [https://perma.cc
/SPR8-W6LY] (“It ignored restrictions painstakingly crafted by lawmakers and assumed a
plenary authority never imagined by Congress.”).
16. See, e.g., Patriot Act Architect Criticizes NSA’s Data Collection, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 20, 2013, 5:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=213902177 [https://perma.cc/G8DV-P42B (dark archive)].
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PATRIOT Act.17 The USA FREEDOM Act was intended to address
what Congress perceived as a significant loophole in the USA
PATRIOT Act that had allowed for bulk metadata collection.18
With the election of President Donald J. Trump, commentators
have placed greater attention on how the Trump administration will
access and utilize tools of mass surveillance to achieve national
security objectives.19 Administration officials have called for the
return of bulk metadata collection.20 Understanding the limitations of
the USA FREEDOM Act can illuminate why bulk metadata
surveillance may likely be expanded.

17. Id. (“What Congress intended and what I intended is that the target had to be a
foreign national and not a U.S. person. He would be targeted, and then they would find
out who that person was calling, both in the United States and elsewhere, rather than
grabbing all of the phone information and working backwards to the target.” (quoting
statement of Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner)); see also Glenn Greenwald, NSA
Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6,
2013, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recordsverizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/F7S2-LMD5].
18. See Patriot Act Architect Criticizes NSA’s Data Collection, supra note 16.
19. Spencer Ackerman & Sabrina Siddiqui, Trump v US Intelligence: Growing Feud
Puts NSA’s Legislative Priority at Risk, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/07/trump-nsa-us-intelligence-prism-reauthorization
[https://perma.cc/37RR-TXYA]; Andy Greenberg, Just in Time for Trump, the NSA
Loosens its Privacy Rules, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.wired.com
/2017/01/just-time-trump-nsa-loosens-privacy-rules/ [https://perma.cc/2EHN-QB5J]; Andy
Greenberg, Imagine if Donald Trump Controlled the NSA, WIRED (Oct. 19, 2016, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/imagine-donald-trump-controlled-nsa/ [https://perma.cc
/L4D3-Z2MB]; Chris Strohm, FBI and NSA Poised to Gain New Surveillance Powers
TECH.
(Nov.
29,
2016,
5:00
AM),
Under
Trump,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-29/fbi-and-nsa-poised-to-gain-newsurveillance-powers-under-trump [https://perma.cc/N6M4-MNGA (dark archive)].
20. Mike Pompeo & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Time for a Rigorous National Debate About
Surveillance, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/time-for-arigorous-national-debate-about-surveillance-1451856106 [https://perma.cc/M76W-HECP
(dark archive)].
Congress should pass a law re-establishing collection of all metadata, and
combining it with publicly available financial and lifestyle information into a
comprehensive, searchable database. Legal and bureaucratic impediments to
surveillance should be removed. That includes Presidential Policy Directive-28,
which bestows privacy rights on foreigners and imposes burdensome requirements
to justify data collection.
Id.; see also Jonathan Landay, Trump’s CIA Pick Supports Domestic Surveillance,
Opposes Iran Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2016, 7:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-trump-pompeo-newsmaker-idUSKBN13D2HM
[https://perma.cc/2B25-BBCG];
Kaveh Waddell, Trump’s CIA Director Wants to Return to a Pre-Snowden World,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/11
/trumps-cia-director-wants-to-return-to-a-pre-snowden-world/508136/
[https://perma.cc
/ZS7F-U4WG].
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The USA FREEDOM Act, although a legislative achievement21
that embodies a tremendous cooperative bipartisan political effort,22
cannot be understood as a statute that regulates bulk metadata
collection generally. Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act is an
achievement in that it forced Congress to meaningfully confront the
role of proper legislative oversight in regulating the metadata
surveillance activities of the NSA23 at the dawn of the big data
revolution.24 Yet, this Article argues, rather than more tightly
21. Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 is
Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics
/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms.html [https://perma.cc/ZS7FU4WG (dark archive)] (“The legislation signaled a cultural turning point for the nation,
almost 14 years after the Sept. 11 attacks heralded the construction of a powerful national
security apparatus. The shift against the security state began with the revelation by
Edward J. Snowden, a former [NSA] contractor, about the bulk collection of phone
records.”).
22. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Congressional Passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 412 (June 2, 2015) (“I particularly
applaud Senators Leahy and Lee as well as Representatives Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner,
Conyers, and Nadler for their leadership and tireless efforts to pass this important
bipartisan legislative achievement.”); Steinhauer & Weisman, supra note 21 (“The battle
over the legislation, the USA [FREEDOM] Act, made for unusual alliances. Mr. Boehner
joined forces with Mr. Obama, the bipartisan leadership of the House Judiciary
Committee, and a bipartisan coalition of senators against Mr. McConnell and his
Intelligence Committee chairman, Senator Richard Burr, Republican of North
Carolina.”).
23. See, e.g., William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in
Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634–36 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive
Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721,
1755–58 (2014). See generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE:
PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016) (tracing the evolution of U.S.
foreign intelligence law and pairing it with the progress of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International
Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015) [hereinafter
Donohue, Section 702] (analyzing the evolution of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Amendments Act, statutory issues related to upstream collection, and
constitutional concerns accompanying these issues); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757
(2014) [hereinafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection] (examining the bulk collection of
metadata under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and related
constitutional concerns); Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in
Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014)
(arguing for a more public advocate to hold FISC accountable in its decision making);
Nathan Alexander Sales, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the
NSA Controversy, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 523 (2014) (examining NSA
programs and their benefits and drawbacks); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The
Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014) (discussing the requirement of notice as it applies to NSA’s
secret use of electronic surveillance);
24. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 157 (2013)
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regulating metadata surveillance, the USA FREEDOM Act allows
for metadata surveillance to proceed under differing justifications and
through more delegated contexts.25 As will be discussed below, bulk
biometric metadata collection, for instance, can occur through
corporate surveillance products contracted or acquired by homeland
security and law enforcement organizations. The federal government
could delegate collection to state and local law enforcement through
cooperative data sharing, for example, of live-streaming video and
other data collected by smart police body cameras or smart glasses.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets forth how police
body cameras will likely create a vehicle for mass biometric collection
generally and bulk biometric metadata collection specifically. This
Part, by way of comparison, describes data garnered from the bulk
telephony surveillance of telecommunications and the bulk biometric
data facial imagery recognition. Part I then argues that the mass
amount of data derived from body-camera surveillance initiatives has
the potential to facilitate database compilation and interagency
sharing at the federal level. It explains how this data collection and
sharing will not be subject to effective oversight due to a lack of
meaningful legal restrictions or administrative walls barring data
sharing within the intelligence community or between federal and
state or local law enforcement entities. Part I discusses the nature of
cooperative data sharing between and among the U.S. Department of
(“When the collection expands to information like financial transactions, health records,
and Facebook status updates, the quantity being gleaned is unthinkably large.”); see also
Mark Andrejevic, Surveillance in the Big Data Era, in EMERGING PERVASIVE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (PICT): ETHICAL CHALLENGES,
OPPORTUNITIES AND SAFEGUARDS 55, 56 (Kenneth D. Pimple ed., 2014) (“[I]n the era
of ‘big data’ surveillance, the imperative is to monitor the population as a whole: otherwise
it is harder to consistently and reliably discern useful patterns.”); David Lyon,
Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA &
SOC’Y, July 2014, at 1, 2 (“[A]s political-economic and socio-technological circumstances
change, so surveillance also undergoes alteration, sometimes transformation.”); Omer
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 241 (2013) (“The Obama Administration
has recently announced a new, multi-agency big data research and development initiative
aimed at advancing the core scientific and technological means of managing, analyzing,
visualizing, and extracting information from large, diverse, distributed, and heterogeneous
data sets.”). See generally JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: PREPARING,
SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION (2013) (explaining Big Data design
and analysis); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014) (discussing the various principles of
Big Data); PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR
ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (providing conceptual, practical, and
statistical frameworks for analyzing emergent issues related to the data revolution).
25. See infra Parts I.C, II.B.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018)

2018]

BULK BIOMETRIC METADATA COLLECTION

1433

Homeland Security (“DHS”) and between state, local, and federal
law enforcement. Part I then contends that DHS—which does not
share the same statutory data collection restraints as the FBI or NSA,
for instance—may, in a matter of time, commandeer the real-time
data flow from state and local law enforcement body-camera feeds
and other live video feeds like from smart glasses if and when worn by
law enforcement or other video feeds. This metadata, once collected,
can be aggregated into databases that are open to interagency queries
and information sharing amongst the entire intelligence community in
such a manner that effectively renders moot much of the “postSnowdengate”26 legislative efforts meant to restrain such activity.
Part II provides a short overview of the NSA’s metadata
surveillance program as it was revealed by the Snowden disclosures.27
This Part includes a brief discussion on how the metadata surveillance
program was justified by the NSA under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act and then subsequently challenged in U.S. federal
courts following the Snowden disclosures. Part II sets forth an
overview of the USA FREEDOM Act as a vehicle for resolving some
of the disputes surrounding the legality and constitutionality of the
NSA’s metadata surveillance activities. It further summarizes why the
USA FREEDOM Act is unlikely to bring metadata surveillance
under proper oversight. These deficiencies include, for instance, the
way in which the USA FREEDOM Act continues to allow for bulk
metadata surveillance activities; the problem of “incidental”
collection of the metadata of U.S. citizens during the course of foreign
intelligence gathering; and the delegable nature of warrantless
metadata surveillance that may allow for other intelligence agencies
beyond the NSA to pursue bulk metadata collection of U.S. citizens
under other authorities and contexts, such as the collection of data
preserved by body cameras.
Part III asserts that the post-USA FREEDOM Act era awaits
clarification from the Supreme Court on the contours of the
protections that will be offered by the Fourth Amendment in the
digital age. This Article concludes that any attempt to constrain bulk
metadata surveillance will necessarily include an assessment of the
efficacy of this surveillance method, as well as an evolution of the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Legislative reform alone that
26. See generally Margaret Hu, Post-Snowdengate, Post-Fascism, THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing
how, in a “post-fascist” world order built on laws and liberalism, technological advances
by the NSA allowed it acquire massive amounts of information).
27. See, e.g., Gellman et al., supra note 13.
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focuses its attention on reining in the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata
collection program specifically and reining in the government’s bulk
collection of domestic records generally does not end the risk of mass
metadata surveillance. The USA FREEDOM Act alone, therefore, is
inadequate for its larger purpose: to secure freedom from mass
surveillance and protection from suspicionless bulk metadata
surveillance.
This Article concludes that rather than more tightly regulating
bulk metadata collection, the Act allows for metadata surveillance to
proceed under differing justifications and in more delegated contexts.
The potential of ubiquitous body cameras presents a case study on
why the USA FREEDOM Act is unable to effectively regulate bulk
biometric metadata collection and other types of bulk metadata
practices.
I. BODY CAMERAS AND BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION
Currently, body-worn cameras carried by state and local law
enforcement are not ubiquitous nor are they multidimensional
cybersurveillance systems.28 Emerging multidimensional systems
embrace “situational awareness” technologies that attempt to
integrate multiple sensors such as video surveillance and other image
sensors with web scraping of social media platforms.29 Situational
awareness technologies, for example, may aim to aggregate these
surveillance methods with database screening and digital-watchlisting
systems, such as DHS databases and the “No-Fly List,” to assess
risk.30 Once pervasive, smart body cameras and smart glasses will
28. See, e.g., Body-Worn Camera Laws Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/body-worn-cameras
-interactive-graphic.aspx [https://perma.cc/L38A-785C].
29. The integration of facial recognition technology with social media platforms and
government databases yields significantly advanced surveillance capabilities in identifying
and tracking individuals. Alessandro Acquisti, an associate professor of information
technology and public policy at the Heinz College and a Carnegie Mellon CyLab
researcher, for instance, conducted a series of experiments regarding social media sites
and facial recognition. See More than Facial Recognition, CARNEGIE MELLON U.,
https://www.cmu.edu/homepage/society/2011/summer/facial-recognition.shtml [https://perma.cc
/A9UH-YT97]. First, his team “identified individuals on a popular online dating site where
members protect their privacy through pseudonyms.” Id. Second, “they identified students
walking on campus—based on their profile photos on Facebook.” Third, they “predicted
personal interests and, in some cases, even the Social Security numbers of the students,
beginning only with a photo of their faces.” Id.
30. See, e.g., DHS Monitoring of Social Networking and Media: Enhancing Intelligence
Gathering and Ensuring Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence of the Comm. Of Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 12–16 (joint statement of Mary
Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security and Richard
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likely work to collect biometric data and biometric metadata.31
Biometric identification technologies—scanned fingerprints and
irises, digitalized photos for facial recognition technology, and DNA,
for example—increasingly inform law enforcement actions and
support risk assessment tools. Once biometric identifiers are
aggregated in databases, they can form the data backbone to support
multidimensional cybersurveillance systems.
Body cameras, as a first-generation technology, are currently
one-dimensional in their surveillance capacities (e.g., only collect
video footage and audio).32 As the technologies associated with body
cameras evolve, they are likely to be used to tether biometric identity
to multidimensional cybersurveillance (e.g., algorithmic-driven
biographical screening and behavioral analysis).33 Body cameras may
also one day be deployed to assess future risk and to isolate other
data deemed suspicious.34
A. What is Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection?
To explain why the USA FREEDOM Act is unlikely to
accomplish its purported original objective of securing freedom from
unwarranted and suspicionless mass surveillance,35 bulk metadata
Chávez, Director, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning, Department of
Homeland Security); see also ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID
SURVEILLANCE: A CONVERSATION 12 (2013); Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions
and an Evolving Katz Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 133–37 (2018); Hu, supra
note 6, at 1542–47; Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 64 (2014); Slobogin, supra note 23, at 1749–50.
31. See, e.g., Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah boyd, Police Body-Worn
Cameras 16–19 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.datasociety.net/pubs
/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJF4-FBBS]; John Sanburn, Storing
Body Cam Data is the Next Big Challenge for Police, TIME (Jan. 25, 2016), http://time.com
/4180889/police-body-cameras-vievu-taser/ [https://perma.cc/DPH2-8SAP]; Jay Stanley,
Body Cameras Should Not Be Live-Streamed, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION: FREE FUTURE
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies
/body-cameras-should-not-be-live-streamed [https://perma.cc/52H3-3XZR].
32. See, e.g., Research on Body-Worn Cameras and Law Enforcement, NAT’L INST.
JUST. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/technology/pages/bodyworn-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/LY5D-6Z5Q].
33. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Horizontal Cybersurveillance Through Sentiment Analysis,
26 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (describing
surveillance in the context of “sentiment analysis,” a form of social media forecasting) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
34. Ava Kofman, Taser Will Use Police Body Camera Videos “To Anticipate Criminal
Activity”, INTERCEPT (Apr. 30, 2017, 9:29 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/04/30/taserwill-use-police-body-camera-videos-to-anticipate-criminal-activity/
[https://perma.cc
/6Q4W-QUET].
35. See Andrea Peterson, Why 76 Lawmakers Just Voted Against Their Own Bill to
Reform the NSA, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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surveillance itself must be better understood. It is important to
understand what metadata is, for instance, and why the intelligence
community refers to metadata intelligence gathering and its
accompanying search and analytic protocols as a “bulk metadata
collection” and a “data query” program rather than a “surveillance”
program.36
Metadata surveillance does not include the conversation of the
call or the written text of the email.37 Although digitalized
surveillance methods are not new, automated and semi-automated
bulk metadata surveillance methods are.38 According to the NSA and
switch/wp/2014/05/22/why-76-lawmakers-just-voted-against-their-own-bill-to-reform-thensa/ [https://perma.cc/4LLB-S233] (“The Senate must take up the original USA
FREEDOM Act—which clearly ends bulk collection and which includes more aggressive
steps to protect Americans’ privacy, such as important provisions to safeguard Americans
from warrantless, backdoor searches of their private communications.” (quoting statement
of Sen. Mark Udall)); Valerie Plame, Would You Rather Not Know?, POLITICO MAG.
(June 5, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/thanks-edward-snowden107494 [https://perma.cc/XU9Z-GNEG] (“Our intelligence agencies should focus their
efforts on terrorists and spies—and not law-abiding Americans.” (quoting statement of
Sen. Mark Udall)).
36. See Ewen MacAskill, The NSA’s Bulk Metadata Collection Authority Just Expired.
What Now?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/nov/28/nsa-bulk-metadata-collection-expires-usa-freedom-act [https://perma.cc
/CC9P-T85G] (“The intelligence agencies hate the description ‘mass surveillance’ and
insist what they are doing is bulk collection of data. They argue that although they
gathered all this material, they only looked at a small part of it and, crucially, did not look
at content.”). See generally JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN
SURVEILLANCE, WHAT IT IS, & WHY YOU SHOULD CARE (2017) (describing the history
of modern surveillance and the policy debate surrounding modern surveillance issues).
37. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches
‘Into the Past’ to Retrieve, Replay Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reachesinto-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e76adc9210f19_story.html [https://perma.cc/YLP9-96MC] (“Most of the programs have
involved the bulk collection of metadata—which does not include call content—or text,
such as e-mail address books.”).
38. Several scholars have noted how transformative technological shifts have also
transformed methods of governance and surveillance as a tool of governance. See, e.g.,
Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2297
(2014) (“The digital era is different. Governments can target for control or surveillance
many different aspects of the digital infrastructure that people use to communicate:
telecommunications and broadband companies, web-hosting services, domain name
registrars, search engines, social media platforms, payment systems, and advertisers.”). See
generally Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the permanency and future of the national surveillance state);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Rehnquist Court and Beyond: Revolution,
Counter-Revolution, or Mere Chastening of Constitutional Aspirations? The Processes of
Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006) (describing the emerging regime of institutions and
practices that make up the national surveillance state as the major constitutional
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proponents of the bulk telephony metadata program, metadata
collection is simply that: the collection or storage of pieces of
metadata, data about data (e.g., time of a call).39 Once databases are
assembled (e.g., the time of the calls of Verizon subscribers on a
specific date), NSA intelligence analyst is able to seek information by
“querying” the database.40
From the Snowden disclosures, it appears the process of what we
might call bulk biometric metadata collection may have already
begun. Several NSA documents revealed that the NSA is compiling
facial images extricated from intercepted communications via its
global surveillance programs to be implemented in cutting-edge facial
recognition initiatives.41 The agency’s utilization of facial recognition
systems has expanded steadily—intercepting “millions of images per
day” that include approximately 55,000 “facial recognition quality
images.”42 The facial images represent “tremendous untapped
potential,” as the NSA explained in a 2011 document.43 Therefore,
this could be fairly characterized as a “bulk biometric collection”
program. In other words, this disclosure appeared to reveal that the
biometric data collection appears to be “bulk” (indiscriminate and
suspicionless) and to share important similarities with the NSA’s bulk
telephony metadata collection program.

development of our era); David Lyon, Biometrics, Identification and Surveillance, 22
BIOETHICS 499 (2008) (describing emerging systems that automatically check biometric
data); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) (describing the
collection and use of biometric data to exercise control over individuals); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 321 (2012) (describing emerging biometric databases).
39. See generally Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security
Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITIES J. 112 (2015) (arguing that the
intelligence community focused on the legality of metadata collection rather than the
policy rationale of the program); PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT
ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE
USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the
_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R82-SFN3] (arguing that metadata
is suggestive of the call’s content and recommending that the telephone metadata
collection program under Section 215 be discontinued).
40. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 2015).
41. See, e.g., James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces from
Web Images, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsacollecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html [https://perma.cc/N73T-KLQX (dark
archive)] (discussing Snowden disclosures that revealed that the NSA collects millions of
digital photographs from Internet and social media sources and utilizes facial recognition
technology to identify individuals).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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To understand the similarities between what this Article refers to
as NSA’s bulk biometric collection program and NSA’s bulk
telephony metadata program, the rudimentary principles of facial
recognition technology must be established. Facial recognition
technology, like other biometric recognition technologies,
necessitates a biometric template (e.g., face print from a digital
photo).44 Facial recognition technology is not dependent upon the
actual digital photo, but rather, utilizes a method of transforming a
face into a “vector of numbers which represent the facial image’s
characteristics including measurements [of facial features], color,
lighting, 2D/3D [that facilitates] a Face Biometric Algorithm.”45 The
process of algorithmically cross-referencing two facial images to
determine a “match” is “not a match between two [biometric]
templates, only a degree of statistical closeness.”46 Put differently,
“algorithms are developed to ‘match’ the probability that the initial
biometric data can be accurately compared to the currently presented
biometric data or to make a determination that the data does not
‘match.’”47
Because facial recognition entails an algorithmically-driven
process, the NSA would not be focused on the content of the digital
image itself. Rather, from this disclosure, it appears that the NSA is
concerned about the data about the data (e.g., metadata and other
data that can be gleaned from the facial image and digital photo or
video image). Securing and examining the content of the photo does
not appear to be the primary objective of the intelligence
organization. Instead, from the disclosures and the NSA’s response to
this disclosure,48 it appears the NSA is primarily interested in data
analytics and metadata analysis that can be informed by bulk
biometric collection, i.e, the facial coordinates or numerical
information that can be pulled from the digital image intercepted
44. Hu, supra note 6, at 1534–35, 1534 n.349.
45. Marc Valliant, Vice President & Chief Tech. Officer, Animetrics, Face
Recognition Technology Today, Presentation before the NTIA Multi-Stakeholder Process
to Develop Consumer Data Privacy Code of Conduct Concerning Facial Recognition
Technology (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia
_feb252014_marcvaillant.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EWZ-QVQW].
46. Id.
47. Hu, supra note 6, at 1535.
48. See id. (reporting that the Snowden documents stated “[i]t’s not just traditional
communications [the NSA is] after: It’s . . . biographic and biometric information.”); see
also Joseph D. Moran, NSA Metadata Collection and the Fourth Amendment, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 999 (2014) (noting that following the disclosures, both
then-President Obama and then-Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
emphasized the focus on metadata).
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from the internet and social media, YouTube, Skype, etc.49 In NSA
documents from this disclosure, it is revealed that facial recognition
technologies are integrated with a wide range of databases in order to
build “comprehensive portraits of intelligence targets.”50
Therefore, the Snowden disclosures surrounding bulk biometric
collection may be viewed as programmatically parallel to the
Snowden disclosures surrounding bulk telephony metadata collection.
The bulk telephony metadata collection program revealed by the
Snowden disclosures was not concerned with the content or the
conversation of the call. This type of telephony metadata collection
now falls within the regulation of the USA FREEDOM Act.
Biometric metadata, specifically, could include photo and video
metadata (e.g., time and place of image) and other biometric
metadata (e.g., metadata from biometric templates and biometric
information records).51 Experts explain that a biometric template (e.g.
face print, scanned fingerprint or iris), when combined with a name
and biometric metadata, constitutes an “identifier” or a method to
positively identify an individual or link an individual’s identity to her
biometric and biographic data.52
Bulk biometric collection and bulk biometric metadata collection
operate similarly to the bulk telephony metadata program. Bulk
biometric metadata collection programs are not necessarily concerned
with the content or the substantive information revealed by the digital
image. The Snowden disclosures revealed that the intelligence
community was concerned with the analysis that could be associated
with the metadata of telecommunications data. Similarly, the data and
metadata aspects of the bulk biometric program appear to reveal that
the intelligence community is concerned with the analysis that can be
derived from facial recognition technology.53 The bulk biometric and
bulk biometric metadata collection programs are poised to increase
exponentially with the normalization of body cameras, does not fall
within the regulation of the USA FREEDOM Act.54

49. See Risen & Poitras, supra note 41 (discussing the NSA’s use of metadata pulled
from images stored on the internet).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., C. Tilton, Biometric Authentication, NAT’L INST. SCI. & TECH. (Dec. 13,
2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/applyingmeasurementscienceworkshopjan12
_13_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/698U-JZKX].
52. Valliant, supra note 45.
53. See e.g., Risen & Poitras, supra note 41.
54. After this disclosure, the NSA spokesperson explained that the collection of facial
imagery was not justified under Section 215. Id. (“The N.S.A. does not collect facial
imagery through its bulk metadata collection programs, including that involving
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What is Bulk Biometric Metadata Used For?

To understand bulk biometric data, it is first important to
understand more about biometrics. “Biometrics is generally
understood to be “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity
verification of individuals using [unique] physiological or behavioral
characteristics.”55 To begin, biometric-based identification or identity
verification systems can collect and analyze “hard biometrics,” which
is also known as “primary biometrics.”56 “Hard,” or “primary,”
biometrics involve the traditional biometric identifiers that identity
verification technologies use. These hard or primary biometrics can
include “hand or finger images, facial characteristics, and iris
recognition”57 Government and industry alike use these biometric
data systems to reach “secure identification and personal verification
solutions.”58
However, biometric-based identification, or identity verification,
systems also can collect and analyze “soft biometrics.”59 Hard and soft
biometrics can be distinguished based on how reliable the biometric
identifier is perceived to be in automated identification matching
technologies. Soft biometrics have been defined as “anatomical or
behavioral characteristic[s] that provide[] some information about the
identity of a person, but does not provide sufficient evidence to
precisely determine the identity.”60 “Soft,” or “secondary,” biometric
identification systems can employ digital analysis or automated
determination of characteristics such as age, height, weight, race or
ethnicity, skin and hair color, scars, birthmarks, and tattoos.61
Behavioral characteristics also can be part of the identity verification
and analysis. Behavioral biometric identifiers are explained as
Americans’ domestic phone calls, authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act,
according to Ms. [Vanee M.] Vines [the agency spokeswoman].”).
55. JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589
(2007).
56. See id. at 590 (discussing “Biometric Technologies”).
57. See id. at 3.
58. Id. at 57–59. Vacca does not provide a definitive definition of hard or primary
biometric data. Nonetheless, he does offer background regarding biometric technology
and verification system standards. Other scholars have explained that soft, or secondary,
biometric characteristics have an experimental nature that can augment hard or primary
biometric characteristics. See e.g., Koichiro Niinuma, Unsang Park & Anil. K. Jain, Soft
Biometric Traits for Continuous User Authentication, 5 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO.
FORENSICS & SECURITY 771, 771–772 (2010).
59. See, e.g., Niinuma et al, supra note 58 at 772 (defining the characteristics of both
“soft” and “hard” biometrics).
60. Karthik Nandakumar & Anil K. Jain, Soft Biometrics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOMETRICS 1235, 1235 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 2009).
61. Id.
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“characteristics that are learned or acquired.”62 Examples of these
identifiers are gait analysis—including the manner and pattern of
walking—and voice identification.
After the collection of the biometric data, the data must be
compiled in a database. This makes it possible to implement identity
screening. When the government is the one to use these biometric
identification technologies, it encourages surveillance, because
biometric cybersurveillance not only identifies people, but also makes
assessments based on identity. Biometric cybersurveillance thus
constitutes an expansive inquiry; it surpasses determining who a
person is to scrutinize people’s intent, such as their criminal and
terroristic dispositions. Furthermore, the identification might, but
might not, involve traditional “surveillance” activities (e.g., domestic
or foreign intelligence gathering). Consequently, progress in
biometric identification and its widespread usages are transforming
the nature of cybersurveillance.
Additionally, big data governance highlights how mass data
collection and digitized assessments are being bureaucratized through
practices that include data mining and database screening, digital
watchlisting, algorithmic intelligence, and risk assessment and
predictive analysis.63 Increasingly, biometric data is incorporated into
these technologies, anchoring the effect of cybersurveillancedependent government programs.64
Presently, biometric data, when sourced specifically to be fed
into verification and identification technologies, are generally
regarded by the public and private spheres alike as benign.65 Big data
surveillance technologies allow for aggregating facial images with
other databases and may constitute the first building block of a global
photo database.
From the government’s perspective, there is little distinction
separating biometric credentialing as a reliable identification method
from behavioral-biometric profiling as both initiatives share the same
62. VACCA, supra note 55, at 3.
63. See Margaret Hu, Biometric Surveillance and Big Data Governance, in
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON SURVEILLANCE LAW 121 (David Gray & Stephen E.
Henderson eds., 2017) (contending that “the biometric surveillance systems and precrime
rationales fictionally portrayed in Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report are now
emerging as a governance reality”).
64. See id. (explaining how “[p]ublic and private decisionmaking protocols
increasingly depend upon biometric identification technologies”).
65. See id. at 126 (identifying the conception that “[b]iometric data is supposedly
scientifically objective and utilize a purportedly neutral analysis of computer driven
algorithmic analysis”).
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end goal: to advance security and pre-crime intervention via the
combination of identification and risk analysis into one streamlined
process.66 Biometric data gathered for one use, however, is
repurposed for another—something that is unavoidable in a big data
world because the biometric cybersurveillance platforms are
increasingly programmed to support mass-data compilation and
predictive policing. This is particularly concerning from a privacy
perspective when it comes to facial imagery derived from law
enforcement body camera data feeds.
How biometric data can assist in targeting decisions, for example,
has also been revealed through the Snowden disclosures and other
revelations. Through recent media disclosures, it was reported that
the Army has awarded at least a half-dozen contracts to technology
firms to fuse facial recognition technology with drone technology.67
Specifically, the contracts seek the development of algorithms that
use two-dimensional images—like those that could be pulled from
body camera feeds—to construct a 3D model of a face.68 The software
is becoming so advanced that other biometric data can be substituted
for facial imagery, as Tim Faltemier, the lead biometrics researcher at
Progeny Systems Corporation, explains:
[I]f the system can’t get a good enough look at a
target’s face, Progeny has other ways of IDing its prey
. . . digital stereotyping using a series of so-called
‘soft biometrics’—everything from age to gender to
“ethnicity” to “skin color” to height and weight—the
system can keep track of targets “at ranges that are
impossible to do with facial recognition.”69
The biometric data technology is not limited to surveillance in
the small data sense—for example, watching an adversary. Through
the pre-crime identification ambitions of big data, the defense
contracts also reveal that the government aims to identify potentially
hostile behaviors and uncover clandestine threats using a tool
referred to as Adversary Behavior Acquisition, Collection,

66. See id. at 128 (detailing how in biometric cybersurveillance systems, “the inquiry
expands from simply verification of identity . . . to include determination of identity
. . . , as well as intent-related assessments”).
67. Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones That Never Forget a Face, WIRED
(Sept.
28,
2011),
https://www.wired.com/2011/09/drones-never-forget-a-face/
[https://perma.cc/2HVN-Z9UW].
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Understanding, and Summarization (“ABACUS”).70 The technology
would aggregate biometric data garnered from intercepted phone
calls, social media and, potentially, body-camera footage and feed this
information into a “human behavior modeling and simulation engine”
that would generate “intent-based threat assessments of individuals
and groups.”71 Put simply, ABACUS could potentially make a
prediction as to which individuals are the most likely to commit acts
of terrorism.
The qualitative distinction between this type of biometric data
and the type of data derived from bulk telephony metadata collection
as disclosed by Snowden is what makes technologies such as
predictive policing so concerning from a privacy perspective. Whereas
bulk telephony metadata collection programs return markers such as
date, time, and location, facial recognition software platforms use
images to identify certain points of an individual’s facial symmetry
and then discard the physical picture—retaining only the unique,
identifying “map” of facial coordinates to be aggregated into a
database.72
When migrated from foreign intelligence use or military use to
domestic law enforcement uses, the current legislative and
constitutional framework for regulating such technology appears to
be absent.73 Thus, the government may perceive that it is free to
implement this technology in a legal vacuum. Similar to the lack of
legal restraint on bulk telephony metadata collection prior to the
Snowden disclosures, there is currently a lack of legal restraint on the
scope and potential applications of bulk biometric data collection
initiatives.74

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the Posse Comitatus Act,
66 EMORY L.J. 697, 711–12 (2017).
74. But see Ted Claypoole & Cameron Stoll, Developing Laws Address Flourishing
Commercial Use of Biometric Information, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/08_claypoole.html [https://perma.cc
/82XE-FDJE] (describing, inter alia, efforts by states—including Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin—to
“regulate third parties’ use and collection of individuals’ biometric information”); see, e.g.,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260:10-b (West, Westlaw through Chapter 7 of the 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (prohibiting collection of biometric data in connection with driver licensing).
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Cooperative Biometric Data Sharing Between Privatized and State
Law Enforcement and the Federal Government

Once biometric data (e.g., digital photo, scanned fingerprint. iris
scan, or DNA) and biometric metadata (e.g., data associated with the
biometric template) is collected and stored in bulk, bulk biometric
metadata surveillance can be shared across entities—data can be
shared between state and local law enforcement and the federal
government; between the government and private contractors; and
between civilian agencies and the intelligence and military
communities.75 For example, after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the DHS, and
other federal agencies encouraged cooperative data sharing as an
effective counterterrorism tool.76 Through programs such as Secure
Communities, coordinated by DHS, state and local law enforcement
organizations are required to share biometric data—digitally scanned
fingerprints—with DHS.77 Specifically, the biometric data is screened
through DHS and FBI databases to determine if an arrestee is an
undocumented immigrant and to facilitate digital watchlisting.78
Body cameras, once ubiquitous and multi-dimensional in their
cybersurveillance capacities, can be used to facilitate cooperative data
sharing between privatized law enforcement entities, state and local

75. See Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 74.
76. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1778–92
(2015) (describing anti-terrorism programs that facilitate state and local law enforcement
data sharing with federal government); Nathan Alexander Sales, Mending Walls:
Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (2010);
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA to Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System
(Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/08/26/tsa-test-new-passenger-prescreening-system [https://perma.cc/8RRW-8L9P] (announcing the “Secure Flight”
program, a post-9/11 prescreening program that compares passenger lists with terrorist
watchlists to assist in maintaining “no fly” lists).
77. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 87, 110–34 (2013); Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149,
209–16 (2013); Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce
Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J. L. & ECON. 937, 938–39 (2014).
78. DHS explains that Secured Communities is justified by a combination of
authorities. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, to
Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement 1 (Oct. 2, 2010), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads
/2012/01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4DU-B5A6]. DHS relied upon
the following: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(4) together
provide the FBI with authority to share fingerprint data with ICE/DHS; (2) 8 U.S.C.
§ 1722 mandates the development of a data sharing system that “enable(s) intelligence
and law enforcement agencies to determine the inadmissibility or deportability of an
[undocumented immigrant]”; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 14616 ratifies information or database
sharing between federal and state agencies. Id. at 4–6.
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law enforcement, and the federal government. Secure Communities
provides a concrete example of how the data collected by state and
local law enforcement through body cameras may one day be placed
into the service of federal database screening and digital watchlisting
systems. Additionally, the bulk biometric collection program revealed
by the Snowden disclosures indicated that in one NSA PowerPoint
slide, a facial image of “an unidentified man” included “more than
two dozen data points” that included “whether he was on the
Transportation Security Administration no-fly list, his passport and
visa status, known associates or suspected terrorist ties, and
comments made about him by informants.”79
Reporting on surveillance practices has helped to reveal
domestic law enforcement’s ever-increasing ability to use biometric
surveillance, thanks to multi-dimensional cybersurveillance tools. For
example, media reports have revealed that state and local
enforcement have partnered with corporations to experiment with
biometric surveillance that relies upon live-feed video surveillance
and real-time social media screening.80 In some instances the law
enforcement agency solicits a corporate surveillance product and in
other instances the corporation may solicit a collaboration with the
state or local law enforcement organization.81 In one program, for
example, a corporation tested a Smart Surveillance System and
Intelligent Video Analytics software with cooperation with a city to
conduct surveillance of a concert.82 The program assimilated and
aggregated information on live video and social media activity
through monitoring of crowds, pedestrians, and vehicles.83 The
“situational awareness software” was defined as
79. Risen & Poitras, supra note 41.
80. See Luke O’Neil, Beantown’s Big Brother: How Boston Police Used Facial
Recognition Technology to Spy on Thousands of Music Festival Attendees, NOISEY (Aug.
13,
2014,
12:00PM),
https://noisey.vice.com/en_us/article/beantowns-big-brother
[https://perma.cc/DXB6-WKY7].
81. In one media disclosure, for example, it was revealed that IBM and the city of
Boston had collaborated on a situational awareness system since March of 2012, when
IBM gave Boston a grant through its “Smarter Cities Challenge.” Chris Faraone, Kenneth
Lipp & Jonathan Riley, Boston Trolling (Part 2), DIGBOSTON (Oct. 9, 2014),
https://digboston.com/boston-trolling-part-2/#sthash.fdmnpZxN.dpbs
[https://perma.cc
/LH3C-FG6X].
82. Chris Faraone, Kenneth Lipp & Jonathan Riley, Boston Trolling (Part I): You
Partied Hard at Boston Calling and There’s Facial Recognition Data to Prove It,
(Aug.
7,
2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140924133220
DIGBOSTON
/https://digboston.com/boston-news-opinions/2014/08/boston-trolling-part-i-you-partiedhard-at-boston-calling-and-theres-facial-recognition-data-to-prove-it/
[https://perma.cc
/4NHM-8SFM].
83. Id.
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software [that] analyzes video and provides alerts when
something happens. For example, if someone walks into a
secure area in view of one of the system’s cameras, the software
would raise a red flag. More sophisticated systems can track
people in real time as they move through crowds — such as
following an unauthorized person in the area — without
requiring dozens or even hundreds of human analysts to watch
video feeds.84
In practice, the situational awareness tool integrated live social
media tracking into already-installed city cameras to screen
individuals for biometric tracking and “forensic identification
purposes.”85 Notably, the surveillance had a “People Search” feature
that could identify individuals by skin color, clothing texture,
baldness, or whether or not they wear glasses.86 Although the
program claimed that there was no use of the facial capture and facial
recognition technology,87 the program possessed the capacity to
conduct such tracking.88 These situational awareness programs show
the significant increase in the real time technological capabilities of
using biometric capture and recognition software. However, the
programs remain highly experimental, with their efficacy and
accuracy unknown.89
Consequently, these technologically evolving surveillance
programs are not necessarily carried out by traditional law
enforcement. Rather, state and local law enforcement are increasingly
relying upon corporate and federal situational-awareness surveillance
products. Multidimensional cybersurveillance tools are expanding in
their purported capacities to assess risk. With evolving technologies,
like body cameras, state and local officers could receive real-time
alerts and information from corporate and federal surveillance
products that may scrape social media, for instance, permitting the

84. Nestor Ramos, City Used High-Tech Tracking Software at ‘13 Boston Calling,
BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/09/07/bostonwatching-city-acknowledges-surveillance-tests-during-festivals/Sz9QVurQ5VnA4a6Btds8xH
/story.html [https://perma.cc/4CXY-EPDX].
85. Faraone et al., supra note 81.
86. Id.
87. Id. (noting that despite those claims, photographs from the IOC obtained and
published by reporters appeared to show Boston Police Officers present during the IOC
test during the event).
88. Ramos, supra note 84.
89. See Tim De Chant, The Limits of Facial Recognition, NOVANEXT (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/the-limits-of-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc
/QXM9-XWU4].
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officers to respond to ongoing situations.90 Body-camera technology
could one day allow law enforcement to sort through social media
photos with facial recognition technology to compile biometric and
biographic profiles of anyone who presents their face in public, for
instance, in a crowd or in a vehicle.91
Data generated by ubiquitous body cameras could be captured
and monetized by corporations as pre-crime intervention products.
The dual purpose and symbiotic relationship of body-camera
surveillance and corporate data surveillance might operate in the
following manner: Law enforcement investigative and monitoring
techniques could be converted into more accurate consumer
monitoring, and the consumer monitoring and trend tracking could
have the potential to be exploited for law enforcement investigation.
Therefore, these growing capacities to conduct situational-awareness
surveillance or multi-dimensional cybersurveillance show how law
enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence and military
communities could use body-camera data and corporate-delegated
surveillance to engage in comprehensive monitoring and biometricbehavioral profiling.
II. BULK TELEPHONY METADATA COLLECTION
As the following discussion in Parts II and III illuminates, the
statutory framework necessary to regulate data sharing, both within
the intelligence community writ large and between federal and state
and local law enforcement, is lacking. The degradation of federalism
in the law enforcement context will likely exacerbate the legal
challenges associated with the large-scale installation of police body
cameras. As body-camera data becomes more available, the federal
government, particularly DHS, may attempt to commandeer the real90. See Andy Cush, Social Media Surveillance Probably Played a Role in Sparking the
Freddie Gray Riot, SPIN (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.spin.com/2016/10/social-mediasurveillance-probably-played-a-role-in-sparking-the-freddie-gray-riot/
[https://perma.cc
/MEF8-CAQG] (explaining how Geofeedia monitored protests and alerted Baltimore
officers to high school students who “planned to walk out of class and use mass transit to
head to the Mondawmin Mall protests,” allowing officers to intercept the students before
they arrived at a protest).
91. Id.; see, e.g., Romine Testimony, supra note 7, at 21 (“The latest FRVT [NIST
Face Recognition Vendor Testing Program] (launched July 2012) evaluated large-scale
one-to-many face recognition algorithms from still face photos and (for the first time)
from video, along with testing automated methods for detecting pose, expression, and
gender.”); Brian Shockley, Vigilant Solutions Unveils Mobile Companion App at IACP,
VIGILANT SOLUTIONS (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/stories-from-thestreet/vigilant-mobile-companion-app-iacp [https://perma.cc/2Z6P-PCU9] (describing
systems that combine facial recognition technology with automated license plate readers).
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time biometric data stream from local law enforcement. Once DHS
and other federal agencies, including intelligence and military
organizations, gain unfettered access to an exponentially larger
amount of body-camera data, such data can then be compiled into
databases to be aggregated, shared, and applied to a wide range of
pre-crime surveillance uses.
The Snowden disclosures suggest that metadata collection and
database queries of stored metadata are not characterized as
surveillance activities by the NSA.92 The bulk telephony metadata
program revealed by the Snowden disclosures did not include an
analysis of “content”—i.e., an examination of the conversation or
review of the substantive information shared in the phone call—
because this distinction was legally significant to the intelligence
community and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)
in distinguishing between a “collection” program and a “surveillance”
program.93 The Snowden disclosures, importantly, revealed that by
discounting the surveillance implications of bulk metadata collection
and database queries, the intelligence community argued, and the
FISC agreed, that Fourth Amendment protections were inapplicable
to metadata surveillance.94
Properly regulating bulk metadata collection by the NSA thus is
complicated significantly by the fact that bulk metadata surveillance
technically does not fall within the category of “content”

92. Because Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows for the collection of
business records, it appears that the bulk telephony metadata program was characterized
by the government as a business records collection program, not as a metadata
surveillance program. Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215, § 501, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)); see, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (“In broad overview, the Government has developed a
‘counterterrorism program’ under [Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified in the
U.S. Code at] Section 1861 in which it collect[s], compiles, retains, and analyzes certain
telephone records, which it characterizes as ‘business records’ created by certain
telecommunications companies (the ‘Bulk Telephony Metadata Program’). The records
collected under this program consist of ‘metadata,’ such as information about what phone
numbers were used to make and receive calls, when the calls took place, and how long the
calls lasted.” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In
re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006)
(describing information collected as “session identifying information,” including “trunk
identifier” and “time and duration of call.”).
93. See MacAskill, supra note 36. See generally GRANICK, supra note 36 (detailing the
history of the policy and legal debate on modern surveillance and arguing that modern
surveillance and democracy are incompatible).
94. See MacAskill, supra note 36.
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surveillance.95 Historically, the intelligence community utilized
traditional surveillance methods to probe the content of the
communication intercepted—for instance, the content of a phone call
(e.g., the conversation) or the content of a written correspondence
(e.g., text of the letter, telegram, or an email).96 Traditional small data
intelligence gathering methods have relied upon human intelligence,
including: sensory perception analysis and other communication
gathering and analytic methods that depended upon human judgment
and decision-making; traditional evidence based upon analog data
and paper-based files; conventional intelligence collection methods,
such as traditional signals intelligence and other traditional
communications interception; and other data analytic tools that have
centered upon traditional research approaches, such as hypothesisdriven methods.97

95. See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (“According to the representations made by
the Government, the metadata records collected under the program do not include any
information about the content of those calls, or the names, addresses, or financial
information of any party to the calls. Through targeted computerized searches of those
metadata records, the NSA tries to discern connections between terrorist organizations
and previously unknown terrorist operatives located in the United States.” (footnote and
citations omitted)); In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *2 (“Telephony
metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication . . . , or the
name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.”).
96. See generally ROBERT M. CLARK, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (2014)
(explaining methods of intercepting phone calls and written correspondence); ROBERT
WALLACE, H. KEITH MELTON, & HENRY R. SCHLESINGER, SPYCRAFT: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE CIA’S SPYTECHS, FROM COMMUNISM TO AL-QAEDA (2008)
(recounting the history of the CIA and explaining methods used by the agency to conduct
intelligence operations). Multiple scholars have discussed the Fourth Amendment
implications of rapidly evolving technologies. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE
ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
115–43 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The
Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 381, 385–91 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 313–14 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 481–82 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801, 802–05 (2004); Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the
Mosaic, BROOKINGS INST. JUST. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers
/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes [https://perma.cc/4988-KSA3]. Other scholars have explained
necessary statutory reforms needed to keep pace with these technological developments.
See, e.g., Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 23, at 900; Donohue, Section 702,
supra note 23, at 265; Margulies, supra note 23, at 5; Christopher Slobogin, Making the
Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of
Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–34 (2012).
97. See Faraone et al., supra note 81.

96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018)

1450

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

Because metadata collection technically does not include
content—for example, collection of metadata includes the time of call
and location of call, but does not include eavesdropping on the
conversation—the privacy concerns associated with its collection are
often underestimated.98 For instance, shortly after the Snowden
disclosures, Senator Dianne Feinstein, then Chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, explained that metadata collection is not
surveillance in that it is pure “content-less” data.99 In contrast, Bruce
Schneier, a renowned cybersecurity expert, has stated unequivocally
that bulk metadata collection is coterminous with modern
surveillance—an equivalency that potentially implicates significant
privacy concerns.100
Consequently, even with passage of the USA FREEDOM Act,
metadata surveillance by the intelligence community is significantly
under-regulated.101 At the dawn of the big data revolution, the U.S.
political branches and U.S. federal courts appear to be conflicted
about how to treat metadata collection under preexisting intelligence
governance structures and the U.S. Constitution.102 Some have argued
98. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 2015) (“That telephone metadata
do not directly reveal the content of telephone calls . . . does not vitiate the privacy
concerns arising out of the government’s bulk collection of such data.”).
99. Ed O’Keefe, Transcript: Dianne Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss Explain, Defend NSA
Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/transcript-dianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend
-nsa-phone-records-program/ [https://perma.cc/2HYJ-RMKF]. Senator Feinstein defended
the NSA bulk telephony metadata collection program in the following way: “[T]his is just
metadata. There is no content involved.” Id.
100. Bruce Schneier, Metadata = Surveillance, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 13, 2014,
12:13
PM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/metadata_survei.html
[https://perma.cc/AP3T-NSQ2] (“Metadata equals surveillance data, and collecting
metadata on people means putting them under surveillance.”).
101. See David Cole, Here’s What’s Wrong with the USA FREEDOM Act, NATION
(May 6, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/heres-whats-wrong-usa-freedom-act/
[https://perma.cc/6XPR-963Y]; Dan Froomkin, USA FREEDOM Act: Small Step for PostSnowden Reform, Giant Leap for Congress, INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015, 6:08 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2015/06/02/one-small-step-toward-post-snowden-surveillance-reform
-one-giant-step-congress/ [https://perma.cc/RZD4-4FW6]; see also Banks, supra note 23, at
1636; Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L.
REV. 951, 954 (2006).
102. The bulk telephony metadata collection program, as had been legally justified
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, faced multiple legal challenges under
several legal theories, with lawsuits filed in federal court immediately following the June 5,
2013 Snowden disclosures. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 182–195
(D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim that Section 215 program is
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment has a likelihood of success on the merits
and ordering injunction, blocking the final weeks of the Section 215 program prior to the
implementation of the USA FREEDOM Act’s reforms to metadata collection), stay
granted sub nom, Obama v. Klayman, 1:13-cv-00851-RJL, 2015 WL 9010330 (D.C. Cir.
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that metadata collection should not fall within traditional conceptions
of what is considered surveillance and, therefore, should not be
regulated in the same manner as traditional surveillance methods.103
Some in the government have explicitly drawn a distinction
between content and non-content surveillance to explain how the
latter falls outside the scope of many of the legal restrictions and
other regulatory constraints imposed on the surveillance activities of
the intelligence community.104 In contrast, some contend that the
pervasive, comprehensive, and automated or semi-automated nature
of bulk metadata surveillance leads to greater harms than the types of
harms enabled by traditional content surveillance.105 Experts, for
Nov. 16, 2015), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(mem.); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding court lacked
jurisdiction to review Administrative Procedures Act [APA] claim but could hear Fourth
Amendment constitutional challenges to NSA’s conduct; and granting motion for
injunction, however, staying the order pending appeal), rev’d sub nom and remanded,
Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d. 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing complaint in part on grounds that
subscribers do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in telephony metadata held by
third parties under Fourth Amendment), vacated, 785 F.3d. 787, 792 (2d Cir. 2015)
(finding that bulk collection of telephone metadata exceeded scope of statutory authority,
remanding for argument on constitutional issues, and affirming district court’s denial of
preliminary injunction), stay ordered, 2015 WL 4196833 (2d Cir. June 9, 2015) (ordering
stay of proceedings pending parties’ supplemental briefing in light of passage of USA
FREEDOM Act), remanded, 804 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 2015) (denying motion for preliminary
injunction, declining to reach constitutional issues for prudential reasons); Margaret Hu,
Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 809–10
(2015).
103. See, e.g., O’Keefe, supra note 99 (statements of Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Saxby
Chambliss).
104. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *5 n.18 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29,
2013) (“In In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d), the court found that only the service provider, as opposed to a customer or
subscriber, could challenge the execution of a § 2703(d) non-content records order. The
court reasoned that ‘[b]ecause Congress clearly provided . . . protections for one type of
§ 2703 order [content] but not for others, the Court must infer that Congress deliberately
declined to permit challenges for the omitted orders.’ The court also noted that the
distinction between content and non-content demonstrates an incorporation of Smith v.
Maryland into the SCA. As discussed above, the operation of Section 215 within FISA
represents that same distinction.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In
re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F.
Supp. 2d 114, 128 (E.D. Va. 2011))).
105. See, e.g., Clapper, 785 F.3d at 794 (“[A] call to a single-purpose telephone number
such as a “hotline” might reveal that an individual is: a victim of domestic violence or rape;
a veteran; suffering from an addiction of one type or another; contemplating suicide; or
reporting a crime. Metadata can reveal civil, political, or religious affiliations; they can also
reveal an individual’s social status, or whether and when he or she is involved in intimate
relationships. . . . The more metadata the government collects and analyzes, . . . the
greater the capacity for such metadata to reveal ever more private and previously
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example, have explained that metadata collection is and should be
regulated as a new form of surveillance in that it is even more
intrusive than traditional intelligence-gathering methods and can
reveal a “startling amount of detailed information”106 in the aggregate
that content surveillance standing alone is incapable of revealing.
Grasping the legal and technological distinctions between
“content” surveillance and “non-content” surveillance in the eyes of
the intelligence community and the FISC underscores why metadata
surveillance appears to be justified by those within the NSA and the
intelligence community. The USA FREEDOM Act does not resolve
the tension between “content” surveillance and “non-content”
surveillance. Therefore, even after passage of the USA FREEDOM
Act, there is still an open debate regarding whether “non-content”
surveillance such as bulk metadata surveillance should fall within the
same oversight and accountability mechanisms that constrain
“content” surveillance. Without a resolution of this tension, bulk
metadata surveillance is likely to continue without proper oversight
and constraint.
A. The NSA’s Bulk Telephony Metadata Collection Program Under
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
Much of what we know about the NSA’s bulk metadata
collection program stems from documents released through the
Snowden disclosures.107 In June 2013, the disclosures by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. intelligence
organization had collected the bulk telephony metadata on every call
generated by customers of the multinational telecommunications
company, Verizon, on a daily basis over the course of the past seven
years.108 Approved through a classified order by the FISC, the bulk
metadata collected by the NSA included the time of the call and the

unascertainable information about individuals.”); see also Declaration of Professor
Edward W. Felten at 20, Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (No. 13 Civ. 3994(WHP))
(“Metadata analysis can reveal the rise and fall of intimate relationships, the diagnosis of a
life-threatening disease, the telltale signs of a corporate merger or acquisition, the identity
of a prospective government whistleblower, the social dynamics of a group of associates,
or even the name of an anonymous litigant.”).
106. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 794.
107. The Snowden disclosures were first revealed by journalist Glenn Greenwald in
June 2013. For an extensive historical account of the Snowden disclosures, see generally
GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE
U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014).
108. See Greenwald, supra note 17.
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length of the call.109 The NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection
program also included: comprehensive communications routing
information; the international mobile subscriber identity number; the
trunk identifier; telephone calling card numbers; and other
metadata.110 Whether the geolocation of the call was included in this
bulk collection program is disputed.111
In the litigation that followed the Snowden disclosures, it
remains judicially unresolved whether metadata collection is either
statutorily or constitutionally permissible.112 Further complicating the
adjudication of these matters, the FISC had adopted the NSA’s view
and held in 2006 that the prior bulk telephony metadata collection
program was justified under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act.113 In the post-Snowden litigation, federal courts have grappled
109. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *1–2 (FISA Ct. May 24,
2006) (“[Here] ‘telephony metadata’ includes comprehensive communications routing
information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating
and terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.”); see also
Greenwald, supra note 17.
110. See Amici Curiae Brief of Experts in Computer and Data Science in Support of
Appellants and Reversal at 7, Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (No. 14-42) (citing In re Application
of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2013
WL 5741573, at *1 n.2 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013)).
111. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 n.17 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Plaintiffs have
alleged that the Government has collected location information for cell phones. While
more recent FISC opinions expressly state that cell-site location information is not
covered by Section 1861 production orders, the Government has not affirmatively
represented to this Court that the NSA has not, at any point in the history of the Bulk
Telephony Metadata Program, collected location information (in one technical format or
another) about cell phones.” (citations omitted)), rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559
(D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Amici Curiae Brief of Experts in Computer and Data Science in
Support of Appellants and Reversal, supra note 110, at 7 (claiming that a trunk identifier
provides “revealing general information about [a] part[y’s] location”).
112. See e.g., Clapper, 785 F.3d at 792 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that “the program
exceed[ed] the scope of what Congress has authorized” under the USA PATRIOT Act);
Obama, 800 F.3d. at 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (finding “that plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the government is collecting from Verizon
Wireless or that they are otherwise suffering any cognizable injury”). Compare Klayman,
957 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (holding that, for purposes of injunctive relief, plaintiff subscribers
had “a substantial likelihood of showing that . . . the NSA’s bulk collection program is
indeed an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment”), with United States v.
Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 WL 6079518, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (holding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata under the Fourth
Amendment), and In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *2–3 (same).
113. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things from [Redacted], 2013 WL 5741573, at *4–6; see also In re Application of the FBI

96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2018)

1454

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

with the question of whether bulk telephony metadata could be
permissibly construed under the statute as a “tangible” business
record “relevant to any particular investigation,” as had been the
government’s interpretation of Section 215.114
According to the government, the statutory basis for bulk
telephony metadata collection expressly derives from Section 215 of
the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorizes the following collection:
“any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents,
and other items).”115 Under the USA PATRIOT Act, “the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director
(whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in
Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the
production of any tangible things.”116 These “tangible things,”
however, must be “relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United
States person or to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.”117 Snowden’s disclosures revealed
that the government had successfully argued in the FISC that bulk
collection of data was necessary ex ante under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act.118 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit found that the district court had erred in granting a
preliminary injunction barring the government from collecting bulk
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the Act because any lapse
in bulk collection was temporary where the FISC viewed the Act as
effectively reinstating Section 215 for 180 days and allowing it to
resume issuing bulk collection orders during that window.119 The bulk
telephony metadata program provides the government with an
aggregate of data (e.g., metadata on all phone calls collected from
Verizon on a daily basis, which allows the NSA to collect the “phone
records of millions of Verizon customers daily”).120 Once the bulk
for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 101368, at *3 (granting the NSA’s application to collect bulk telephony metadata).
114. See, e.g., Clapper, 785 F.3d at 810–11.
115. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215, § 501(a)(1), 115 Stat.
272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012)).
116. Id.
117. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).
118. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d on other
grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In re Application of the FBI for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. BR
13-80, at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-toVerizon.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KB6-FX45].
119. Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d. 559, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
120. Greenwald, supra note 17.
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data is amassed, the NSA may query a specific identifier within the
aggregated database and determine the relevance of the data to an
ongoing investigation.121
In challenges filed immediately after the Snowden disclosures,
federal courts attempted to resolve whether the NSA’s bulk
telephony metadata collection program was consistent with
constitutional protections such as the First Amendment’s
associational and expressive freedom guarantees, and the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures.122 The issue of whether the Act constitutionally resolves
metadata surveillance remains unclear.123 As discussed below, federal
courts in the post-Snowden litigation appear reluctant to reach the
question of whether bulk telephony metadata collection is
constitutional under the First Amendment and the Fourth
Amendment.124

121. “After collecting these telephone records, the NSA stores them in a centralized
database. Initially, NSA analysts are permitted to access the Section 215 calling records
only through ‘queries’ of the database. A query is a search for a specific number or other
selection term within the database.” PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra
note 39, at 8; see also Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (“According to Government officials,
this aggregation of records into a single database creates ‘an historical repository that
permits retrospective analysis,’ Govt.’s Opp’n at 12, enabling NSA analysts to draw
connections, across telecommunications service providers, between numbers reasonably
suspected to be associated with terrorist activity and with other, unknown numbers.”); In
re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6–7 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013);
Christopher Slobogin, Cause To Believe What? The Importance of Defining a Search’s
Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata Surveillance Program, 66
OKLA. L. REV. 725, 737 (2014) (“But at the time of the bulk collection, those links would
not be known; the NSA would subsequently have to query the data to learn about those
links. Thus, one would be hard pressed to say that, at the time of the bulk collection, the
government meets the relevance standard, much less the probable cause or reasonable
suspicion standards, if the object of the seizure is Redding’s [Safford Unified School
District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009)] ‘evidence of criminal activity’ or the
LEATPR [American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records] Standards ‘evidence of crime’ that is associated with the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards.”).
122. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 183, 189 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding
that plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on Fourth Amendment
claim collection and querying of bulk telephony metadata records constituted an
unconstitutional search).
123. See id. at 178 (granting preliminary injunction to enjoin “the future collection and
querying of [plaintiffs’] telephone record metadata” on basis that Section 215 program is
unconstitutional); vacated by Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Motion to Vacate Preliminary Injunction and Dismiss Appeal on Grounds of Mootness,
Klayman v. Obama, 15-5307 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2016) (filing motion to dismiss matter as
moot in light of enactment and implementation of USA FREEDOM Act).
124. See infra Section II.B.
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Post-Snowden Legislative Reform: The USA FREEDOM Act

The most developed litigation challenging the legality and
constitutionality of the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection
program is represented by two cases: ACLU v. Clapper125 and
Klayman v. Obama.126 Both of these challenges to the Section 215
bulk metadata collection program in federal court were brought days
after the Snowden disclosures first came to light in June 2013.127 U.S.
District Court Judge William H. Pauley III for the Southern District
of New York, in ACLU v. Clapper, and U.S. District Court Judge
Richard Leon for the District of Columbia, in Klayman v. Obama,
considered the same program—NSA’s bulk telephony metadata
collection program—and reached entirely different results in their
considerations of injunctive relief for their plaintiffs.128 In both
Clapper and Klayman, the plaintiffs asserted a combination of
statutory and constitutional claims129 to challenge the bulk telephony
metadata program that derived from a April 25, 2013 FISC order
compelling Verizon Business Network Services to produce to the
NSA on “an ongoing daily basis . . . all call detail records or
‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i)
between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the
United States, including local telephone calls,” pursuant to Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.130

125. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing complaint in part on grounds that
subscribers do not have legitimate expectation of privacy in telephony metadata held by
third parties under Fourth Amendment precedent), vacated, 785 F.3d. 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
126. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that court lacked jurisdiction to review
Administrative Procedure Act [“APA”] claim but could hear Fourth Amendment
constitutional challenges to NSA’s conduct, and granting motion for injunction, however,
staying the order pending appeal).
127. See supra notes 111–13 For a detailed history of the Snowden disclosures, see
generally GREENWALD, supra note 107.
128. Compare Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 9–10 (granting, in part, a preliminary
injunction on Fourth Amendment grounds, but staying the order pending appeal), with
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 742, 752, 757 (denying injunctive relief after holding the
metadata collection was authorized by the statute and that the metadata collection did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
129. See, e.g., Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (“Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the
Government has violated their individual rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution and has violated the Administrative Procedure Act
(‘APA’) by exceeding its statutory authority under FISA.”).
130. See id. at 10 (quoting In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the
Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. on Behalf of MCI
Commc’n Servs., Inc. d/b/a Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13–80 at 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25,
2013)); see also In re Application No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *1–2
(FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). The FISC would reauthorize this program every ninety days
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On June 2, 2015, the U.S. Congress passed new legislation, the
USA FREEDOM Act, intended to help resolve the legal dispute and
to bring the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program
under tighter regulation.131 Proponents of the USA FREEDOM Act
contend that the new law corrects the primary statutory and
constitutional deficiencies of the bulk metadata collection program
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.132 The law was passed
two years after the Snowden disclosures and less than four weeks
after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined in
Clapper that the NSA had exceeded the scope of its statutory
authority in impermissibly reading Section 215 to include bulk
telephony metadata collection.133
Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act requires the government
to seek from the FISC orders for metadata records directly held by
companies after identifying a specific person, account, address, or
other specific identifier as a subject of a specific investigation.134
If the order is granted, the telecommunications provider or other
corporate provider must produce the metadata records pursuant to a
specific investigation.135 In particular, the Act seeks to end the prior
following the original authorization which was granted in 2006. See Slobogin, supra note
23, at 1757.
131. See supra notes 11–12.
132. See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Congressional Passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (June 2, 2015); Press Release,
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, Conyers, Sensenbrenner, Nadler Applaud
Clean Passage of the USA FREEDOM Act in the Senate (June 2, 2015),
https://sensenbrenner.house.gov/2015/6/goodlatte-conyers-sensenbrenner-nadler-applaudclean-passage-of-the-usa-freedom-act-in-the-senate [https://perma.cc/9RST-FEFL].
133. Edward Snowden’s disclosures were first published on June 5, 2013, although
some media reports date the disclosures as first published on June 6, 2013, with varying
time zones. Greenwald, supra note 17; see also Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the
NSA Files – Timeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline [https://perma.cc/KWN8-PHYB].
The Second Circuit issued its decision on May 7, 2015. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d. 787,
792 (2d Cir. 2015).
134. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101(a)(3), 129 Stat. 268, 269–
70 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(C) (2016)) (“[An] application for the production on
a daily basis of call detail records . . . conducted to protect against international
terrorism. “a statement of facts showing that . . . (1) there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the call detail records sought to be produced based on the specific selection
term required . . . are relevant to such investigation; and (ii) there are facts giving rise to
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that such specific selection term is associated with a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”).
135. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, § 101(b), 129 Stat. at 270; Steinhauer &
Weisman, supra note 21 (“The storage of those records now shifts to the phone
companies, and the government must petition a special federal court [FISC] for
permission to search them.”). Because the FISC orders may remain largely classified,
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practice of allowing the NSA to collect bulk telephony metadata
records and then store the records for future use.136 In other words,
under Section 215, bulk metadata collection came first and the
querying of the database by the NSA came later on an as-needed
basis, effectively allowing the NSA to control the maintenance and
use of the bulk telephony metadata records.137 Congress found this
practice objectionable because it gave the NSA apparently unfettered
access to the metadata.138 Subsequently, Congress attempted to end it
by placing a restraint on the government’s ability to collect records by
forcing the government to seek the production of the metadata
records directly from the corporate entity (e.g., telecommunications
company or Internet provider) in the USA FREEDOM Act.139
exactly how the USA Freedom Act will be implemented may remain unknown to the
public. See, e.g., § 602(a), 129 Stat. at 281 (allowing declassification for opinions that
include “a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law, including any
novel or significant construction or interpretation of the term ‘specific selection term’, and,
consistent with that review, make publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each
such decision, order, or opinion”).
136. See Cole, supra note 101 (explaining that under the USA FREEDOM Act, “the
phone companies, not the NSA, would store the data”). Applications for orders to
produce phone metadata records now must contain:
(C) [A] statement of facts showing that—
(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be
produced based on the specific selection term required under subparagraph (A)
are relevant to such investigation; and
(ii) there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion that such specific selection term is
associated with a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international
terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.
USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, § 101(a)(3)(C), 129 Stat. at 270.
137. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The government
explains that it uses the bulk metadata collected pursuant to these orders by making
‘queries’ using metadata ‘identifiers’ (also referred to as ‘selectors’), or particular phone
numbers that it believes, based on ‘reasonable articulable suspicion,’ to be associated with
a foreign terrorist organization . . . . The identifier is used as a ‘seed’ to search across the
government’s database; the search results yield phone numbers, and the metadata
associated with them that have been in contact with the seed.”)
138. See Dan Froomkin, For the First Time Since 9/11, Congress Checks the Security
State, INTERCEPT (June 1, 2015, 9:47 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/01/first-timesince-911-congress-checks-security-state/ [https://perma.cc/P6Z6-FDJR] (quoting Sen. Ron
Wyden, D-Ore., as saying that, “[t]onight the collection of phone records of millions of
innocent Americans will end” and “[t]he demise of this dragnet surveillance is a victory for
the principle that Americans do not need to sacrifice liberty to have security”).
139. See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 8–10, 17–18 (2015); 160 CONG. REC.
H4793 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (“The USA
FREEDOM Act makes clear that the government cannot indiscriminately acquire
Americans’ call detail records and creates a new, narrowly tailored process for the
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Next, by requiring the NSA to articulate specific information for
the person, account, address, or other precise identifier that is the
subject of a particular investigation, the USA FREEDOM Act seeks
to limit the scope of records sought by the government.140 This
contrasts with the prior practice, under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, where the metadata collection purportedly could
proceed in an indiscriminate and suspicionless fashion.141 The bulk
collection justification under Section 215 by the government arguably
allowed the NSA to collect all metadata on all calls, regardless of
whether a specific person, account, or address was under
investigation.142 In enacting the USA FREEDOM Act, Congress
appeared to agree with the Second Circuit in Clapper that Section 215
could not be reasonably read to allow all telephony metadata as
“relevant” to an investigation.143 Therefore, the USA FREEDOM

collection of these records.”); 159 CONG. REC. S6052–54 (daily ed. July 30, 2013)
(statement of Sen. Tom Udall) (calling for a targeted approach where the service
providers maintain databases to meet national security needs while protecting Americans’
privacy); Cole, supra note 101.
140. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, § 101(a)(3)(C), 129 Stat. at 270 (requiring the
necessary statement of facts to relate to a “specific selection term”).
141. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 06-05, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101368, at *3
(FISA Ct. May 24, 2006) (“To the extent practicable, the Custodians of Records of [TEXT
REDACTED] shall produce to NSA an electronic copy upon service of the appropriate
secondary order, and continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the
duration of this order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, of the following tangible
things: all call-detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by such companies as
described above.”); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2013)
(characterizing the bulk metadata collection program as allowing the Government to
“indiscriminately collect[] [subscribers’] telephony metadata along with the metadata of
hundreds of millions of other citizens without any particularized suspicion of
wrongdoing”), rev’d on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
142. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147002, at *1–4
(FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) (requiring the redacted party, which was soon revealed to be
Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., to produce all daily telephony metadata to the
FBI, except for communications “wholly originating and terminating in foreign
countries”); Bart Forsyth, Banning Bulk: Passage of the USA FREEDOM Act and Ending
Bulk Collection, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1307, 1312 (2015) (“With the bulk collection of
telephony metadata, the government’s statement of facts [showing relevancy] merely
articulates a supposed value in collecting data on every call. There [is nothing] to
differentiate calls that are more likely to relate to the government’s investigation from
every other call made by innocent Americans.”).
143. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 810–21 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the
government’s argument that metadata is “‘relevant’ because they may allow the NSA, at
some unknown time in the future . . . to identify information that is relevant” to be
“unprecedented and unwarranted”); see, e.g., Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1312 (“The
government’s interpretation of the section is so broad that it ultimately conflates relevance
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Act, unlike Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, appears to
require a minimum demonstration that the metadata is related to a
specific entity that is the subject of a specific investigation in order to
establish that the metadata is “relevant” to that specific
investigation.144
Prior to enactment of the Act, the NSA was allowed to seek
records associated with up to three “hops” from the original “seed.”145
It is estimated that the “three-hop analysis” could result in the
potential to query millions of phone records.146 The USA FREEDOM
Act further limited the scope of the records that could be requested
by restricting the number of “hops” from an original “seed” to two
with utility—the records are relevant because the government believes it needs them. This
is not a standard at all.”).
144. See Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 180 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he USA
FREEDOM Act expressly prohibits the Government from obtaining telephony metadata
in bulk.”).
145. President Obama implemented a revision from three “hops” to two “hops” prior
to the enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act., Presidential Remarks on United States
Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 7 (Jan. 17, 2014) (“Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are
two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization instead of the
current three.”). President Obama also took additional action to limit the querying of
the database of telephony metadata prior to the USA FREEDOM Act. Id. (“And I
have directed the Attorney General to work with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court so that during this transition period, the database can be queried only after a
judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency.”).
146. The “three-hop” analysis was revealed during congressional testimony on July 17,
2013 in the aftermath of the Snowden disclosures. Pete Yost, Congress Expresses Anger
GLOBE
(July
18,
2013),
Over
NSA
Surveillance
Program,
BOS.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/07/17/nsa-spying-under-fire-you-got-problem
/Ev73I1XwPYtvD2WFZ6idGK/story.html [https://perma.cc/BX5C-GQGZ (dark archive)]
(“For the first time, NSA Deputy Director John C. Inglis disclosed that the agency
sometimes conducts what is known as three-hop analysis. That means the government can
look at the phone data of a suspected terrorist, plus the data of all of the contacts, then all
of those people’s contacts, and all of those people’s contacts.”). The NSA explained that:
“[w]ith three-hop analysis, [i]f the average person calls 40 unique people, three-hop
analysis could allow the government to mine the records of 2.5 million Americans when
investigating one suspected terrorist.” Id. The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia explained further:
In plain English, this means that if a search starts with telephone number (123)
456–7890 as the “seed,” the first hop will include all the phone numbers that (123)
456–7890 has called or received calls from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers),
the second hop will include all the phone numbers that each of those 100 numbers
has called or received calls from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers for each
one of the 100 “first hop” numbers, or 10,000 total), and the third hop will include
all the phone numbers that each of those 10,000 numbers has called or received
calls from in the last five years (say, 100 numbers for each one of the 10,000
“second hop” numbers, or 1,000,000 total).
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted).
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“hops,” or in other words, the FISC may order the production of “the
call detail records associated with the initial telephone number [the
“seed”] and the records associated with the records returned in the
initial hop.”147 The first “hop” is comprised of all of the records
associated with the “seed”; the second “hop” is comprised of all of the
records associated with the first “hop.”148 Bart Forsyth deconstructs
this concept further:
A second “hop” does not include an individual listed in a
telephone contact list, or on a personal device that uses the
same wireless router as the seed, or that has similar calling
patterns as the seed. Nor does it exist merely because a
personal device has been in the proximity of another personal
device. These types of information are not maintained by
telecommunications carriers in the normal course of business
and, regardless, are prohibited under the definition of ‘call
detail records’ [under the USA FREEDOM Act].149
Finally, the USA FREEDOM Act implemented changes to the
FISC, including allowing for the appointment of “amicus curiae” in
FISC matters involving novel and significant interpretations of the
law,150 and requiring more rigorous declassification reviews of FISC
decisions.151
Importantly, however, the Act has been criticized as being
inadequate to its purpose.152 The criticism warrants careful attention
147. Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1339–40 (discussing Section 501 of the USA
FREEDOM Act).
148. Id. at 1339 n.149.
149. Id.
150. Section 401 of the USA FREEDOM Act authorizes the presiding judge of the
FISC to appoint at least five individuals to serve as “amicus curiae” to offer expertise in
the application of the law to new technologies. Pub. L. No. 114-23, sec. 401, § 103, 129
Stat. 268, 279–81 (2015) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2016)). The amici
attorneys are eligible for security clearances and “will be tasked with making arguments
addressing privacy and civil liberties, and will have access to relevant materials, including
government applications, petitions, and motions [subject to being eligible for any
necessary security clearances].” PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS ASSESSMENT REPORT 5 (2016), https://www.pclob.gov/library
/Recommendations_Assessment_Report_20160205.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6ZV-PVT6].
151. Id. at 8 (“[T]he USA FREEDOM Act now requires that the government will
conduct a declassification review of each new decision of the FISC and FISCR ‘that
includes a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law,’ . . . and that
the government will make declassified versions of these opinions publicly available to the
greatest extent practicable.”).
152. See, e.g., David Greene & Mark Jaycox, Op-ed: Why the EFF is Pulling its Support
for the USA FREEDOM Act, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 3:25 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/op-ed-why-the-eff-is-pulling-its-support-for-theusa-freedom-act/ [https://perma.cc/Y82T-YUGU]; Neema Singh Guliani, What’s Next for
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in that the Act may not be sufficient to correct the statutory and
constitutional deficiencies of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Specifically, the Act may not curb bulk metadata collection for
reasons that include, but are not limited to, the following three
considerations. First, some argue that the Section 215 bulk telephony
metadata program, as a “warrant”-based program (e.g., subject to
FISC orders), was less problematic than warrantless bulk metadata
collection programs.153 Thus, the primary focus of statutory reform,
Surveillance Reform After the USA FREEDOM Act, ACLU (June 3, 2015, 6:15 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/whats-next-surveillance-reform-after-usafreedom-act [https://perma.cc/M46T-NT85]. The USA Freedom Act, we hope, is only the
beginning of this new era. The coalition that helped to advance the USA Freedom Act
must now work to advance additional reforms. This includes:
Urging both the president and Congress to rein in surveillance under Executive
Order 12333, which has been used to collect information about millions of
Americans absent any judicial process[;]
Reforming Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (set to expire
in 2017), which allows the government to collect the content of Americans’
communications with individuals abroad[;]
Reforming other authorities, such as the administrative subpoena statutes, which
have been used for bulk collection in the past[;]
Further reforming the authorities addressed in the USA Freedom Act, including
Section 215, FISA’s pen-register and trap-and-trace provisions, and national
security letters[;]
Rejecting efforts to expand surveillance through cybersecurity information-sharing
legislation.
Id; see also Kurt Opshal & Rainey Reitman, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Supporting the USA
FREEDOM ACT as a Step Towards Less Surveillance, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/floor-not-ceiling-supporting-usafreedom-act-step-towards-less-surveillance [https://perma.cc/LS9U-TLVR] (“It does not
touch problems like NSA programs to sabotage encryption standards, it does not
effectively tackle the issue of collecting information on people outside of the United
States, and it doesn’t address the authority that the government is supposedly using to tap
the data links between service provider data centers, such as those owned by Google and
Yahoo.”).
153. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. E883 (daily ed. June 11, 2015) (statement of Hon. Ted
Poe) (claiming that the USA FREEDOM Act would not end bulk surveillance because it
“does nothing to limit government spying under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments
Act”); AMOS TOH, FAIZA PATEL & ELIZABETH GOITEIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
OVERSEAS SURVEILLANCE IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD 34 (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Overseas_Surveillance_in_an
_Interconnected_World.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3UZ-TDHD] (discussing privacy impact of
NSA’s surveillance activities through Executive Order 12333 and lack of transparency of
such activities); Ashley Gorski & Patrick C. Toomey, Unprecedented and Unlawful: The
NSA’s
“Upstream”
Surveillance,
JUSTSECURITY
(Sept.
19,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/33044/unprecedented-unlawful-nsas-upstream-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/8Y4S-KY37] (challenging whether “Upstream” surveillance is authorized
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according to some experts, should be on the warrantless collection of
metadata and content data that was also revealed under the Snowden
disclosures as justified under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Amendments Act (“FAA”).154 Second, some
scholars note that statutory reform is a necessary but not a sufficient
step toward the proper regulation of big data cyber surveillance
methods.155 They observe “that the Fourth Amendment must evolve
along with” the statutory regime in order to properly restrain new and
emerging surveillance methods, of which bulk metadata collection is

by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act); Rainey Reitman, The
New USA FREEDOM Act: A Step in the Right Direction, but More Must Be Done,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015
/04/new-usa-freedom-act-step-right-direction-more-must-be-done [https://perma.cc/2H932ZCF] (“The new USA [FREEDOM] Act does not address Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act, the problematic 2008 law that the government uses for PRISM and
‘upstream’ mass surveillance.”); John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The
Reagan Rule That Lets the NSA Spy on Americans, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-thatlets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/TF9H-54NF] (explaining that although U.S. persons communications
may not be targeted under Executive Order 12333, the executive order explicitly
authorizes their retention if collected “incidentally” (with incidentally being “an NSA
term of art”) during a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation).
154. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 23, at 67–68. As a result of “sunset” clauses,
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act was set to expire on June 1, 2015, whereas Section
702 of the FISA Amendments Act was not set to expire until 2017. PATRIOT Sunsets
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, § 2(a), 125 Stat. 216, 216 (codified in scattered
sections of 50 U.S.C.); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). Because Section 215 preceded
Section 702 in expiration, Section 215 appeared to take precedence as a matter of
legislative reform. See, e.g., Timothy Edgar, Without USA Freedom Act, NSA Could
Resume Bulk Collection Even if Patriot Act Provisions Expire, LAWFARE (May 30, 2015,
5:20 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/without-usa-freedom-act-nsa-could-resume-bulkcollection-even-if-patriot-act-provisions-expire [https://perma.cc/62RH-HKEF]; Denise E.
Zheng, Electronic Surveillance After Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (June 1, 2015), http://csis.org/publication/electronicsurveillance-after-section-215-usa-patriot-act [https://perma.cc/SQ8F-QURT]. Nevertheless,
the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act passed by floor vote on January 11, 2018. An
Act to Amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 115-118, 132
Stat. 3 (2018).
155. See, e.g., Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 23, at 821; Donohue,
Section 702, supra note 23, at 264–65. Professor Donohue recognized the need for a Fourth
Amendment analysis, as well as the tension that exists when collecting programs are either
seemingly performing the analysis themselves or are not fully understood such that human
analysts can properly dispel Fourth Amendment concerns. See Donahue, Bulk Metadata
Collection, supra note 23, at 821 (“[I]t appears that neither the NSA nor FISC had an
adequate understanding of how the algorithms operate. Nor did they understand the type
of information that had been incorporated into different databases, and whether they had
been subjected to the appropriate legal analysis before data mining.”).
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but one.156 Third, experts contend that strict compliance with the
USA FREEDOM Act will not act as a constraint on metadata
collection.157 Each of these criticisms will be briefly summarized
below.
First, beyond the Section 215 bulk telephony metadata
program—which constituted bulk metadata collection pursuant to an
order issued by the FISC—other authorities appear to have been
interpreted by the intelligence community to allow for warrantless
bulk metadata collection.158 From the Snowden disclosures, it appears
that in some instances the NSA saw neither the need to resort to the
FISC to seek query-specific orders nor the express need to seek data
from a third-party provider (e.g., a telecommunications corporation
or Internet provider).159 Under Section 702’s “UPSTREAM”
156. See, e.g., Jennifer Granick, Prediction: Fourth Amendment Evolves in 2014, JUST
SECURITY (Dec. 31, 2013, 4:32 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/5195/prediction-fourthamendment-evolves-2014 [https://perma.cc/F2QM-5GNX] (“A consensus seems to be
emerging that the Fourth Amendment must evolve along with technology and government
surveillance capabilities.”).
157. See, e.g., Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1339; Ted Poe & Rand Paul, Poe, Rand: NSA
Bulk Collection of Data Tramples Our Rights, HOUS. CHRON. (May 22, 2015, 9:20 PM),
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Poe-Rand-NSA-bulk-collection-of-data-tramples6282272.php [https://perma.cc/N8DW-6UW9] (claiming that the USA FREEDOM Act
would not end bulk surveillance because it “does nothing to limit government spying
under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act”). The USA FREEDOM Act allows
FISC to order companies to produce up to two “hops.” H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 17
(2015). The new authority in the in the USA FREEDOM Act was “designed to allow the
government to search telephone metadata for possible connections to international
terrorism—[however, it] does not preclude the government’s use of standard business
records orders under Section 501 to compel the production of business records, including
call detail records.” Id. at 18.
158. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, Julie Tate & Ashkan Soltani, In NSA-Intercepted Data,
Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST. (July 5, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not
-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-85724b1b969b6322_story.html [https://perma.cc/BRQ8-4CAD]; Elizabeth Goitein, Don’t Lose
Track: Here’s What’s Going on with the NSA, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (July 8, 2014),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/dont-lose-track-heres-whats-going-nsa [https://perma.cc
/4RDZ-SHHP].
159. From the Snowden disclosures, it appears that metadata surveillance is potentially
justified under several legal authorities: Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Section
702 of FISA Amendments Act, and Executive Order 12333. Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act authorized the collection of “tangible things” that were relevant to an
authorized investigation “to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.” USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, sec. 215,
§ 501(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). Section
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act expired on June 1, 2015, and was replaced by the USA
FREEDOM Act. Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act Provisions Have Expired: What Happens
Now?, CNN (June 1, 2015, 10:48 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/politics/whathappens-if-the-patriot-act-provisions-expire/index.html
[https://perma.cc/BNP6-E49Q].
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collection program, for instance, it was revealed that the NSA has the
capacity to directly intercept bulk metadata and collection the content
of communications traveling through fiber-optic cables that comprise
the so-called “Internet backbone.”160 The NSA justified direct tapping
of the fiber-optic cables to collect metadata—specifically “discrete
wholly domestic communications” from U.S. citizens “that are neither
to, from, [or regarding] a targeted selector”—by citing its authority to
collect foreigners’ data, and suggested that the data collected on U.S.
persons through Section 702 was considered “incidental” and not
purposeful and, thus, lawful.161 The federal courts have not yet had an
opportunity to determine whether this reading of Section 702 is
permissible.162
Section 702 of FISA Amendments Act authorizes the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence to target non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States” for surveillance. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, sec. 101, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2437–48 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a (2012)). Executive Order 12333 delegates to the Attorney General the power to
authorize intelligence gathering pursuant to collection, dissemination and retention
protocols set forth by the Order. Exec. Order No. 12333, § 2.5, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,951
(Dec. 4, 1981), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13284 § 18, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075, 4077 (Jan.
23, 2003), Exec. Order No. 13355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004), and Exec. Order
No. 13470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (July 30, 2008).
160. See, e.g., James Ball, Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our
Revelations So Far, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/aug/21/edward-snowden-nsa-files-revelations [https://perma.cc/7SGK-NMR9];
Craig Timberg, NSA Slide Shows Surveillance of Undersea Cables, WASH. POST (July 10,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen
/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
[https://perma.cc/J6KY76TK] (describing NSA slide that articulates UPSTREAM as accessing “communications
on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past”).
161. See [Redacted], 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157706, at *104 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)
(“The government stresses that the non-target communications of concern here (discrete
wholly domestic communications and other discrete communications to or from a United
States person or a person in the United States that are neither to, from, nor about a
targeted selector) are acquired incidentally rather than purposefully.”); see also James Ball
& Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for US Citizens’ Emails
and Phone Calls, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls [https://perma.cc/SA8E8KXD].
162. See, e.g., Donohue, Section 702, supra note 23, at 259–63 (“The petitioner’s
concern with incidental collections is overblown. It is settled beyond peradventure that
incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do
not render those acquisitions unlawful. The government assures us that it does not
maintain a database of incidentally collected information from non-targeted United States
persons, and there is no evidence to the contrary. On these facts, incidentally collected
communications of non-targeted United States persons do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.”) (quoting In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (citations
omitted))); see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 981, 1025–26 (2014) (citing United States v. Mohamud, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Or.
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Second, under the Fourth Amendment, it is unresolved under
what circumstances the collection of metadata may constitute an
unreasonable search or seizure.163 The Fourth Amendment’s thirdparty doctrine may be interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow for
bulk metadata collection.164 Further, the USA FREEDOM Act
expressly limits bulk telephony metadata collection only—it does not
appear to limit the type of metadata that can be generated by emails,
Internet searches and web-browsing history, social media network
activities, or information retained by smart technologies and other
electronic devices.165
And, third, so long as the underlying presumption of efficacy
persists, the intelligence community will likely collect the bulk
metadata that it perceives it needs to serve purportedly mission-

2013)). In several cases, the defendant challenged the permissibility of the government
withholding secret NSA surveillance evidence during discovery. Fairfield & Luna, supra at
1026 n.294.
163. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 195–98 (D.D.C. 2015)
(concluding plaintiff’s claim that Section 215 program is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment has a likelihood of success on the merits and ordering injunction, blocking
the final weeks of the Section 215 program prior to the implementation of the USA
FREEDOM Act’s reforms to metadata collection), staying order, 2015 WL 9010330 (D.C.
Cir. 2015), rehearing denied en banc, 805 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (mem.); United States
v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164038, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
2013) (holding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata
under the Fourth Amendment).
164. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[W]hen
a person voluntarily conveys information to a third party, he forfeits his right to privacy in
the information . . . . The collection of breathtaking amounts of information
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform that sweep [of bulk telephony
metadata collection] into a Fourth Amendment search.”), vacated, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.
2015); In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things,
No. BR 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *9 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (“Prior FISC opinions
have unanimously concluded that the production of call detail records to the government
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, relying on [Smith v.
Maryland].” (citing 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
165. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268, 269–71
(2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (2016)). An argument could be made that the
USA FREEDOM Act pertains to all metadata records and is not intended to regulate
only telephony metadata collection in that Section 103 is titled, “Prohibition on the Bulk
Collection of All Tangible Things.” See id. However, the USA FREEDOM Act expressly
refers to the regulation of “call detail records” in Section 101, thereby suggesting that the
focus of the statute is on bulk telephony metadata collection. Id. Further, the USA
FREEDOM ACT appears to limit its restrictions to bulk collection of domestic records
and not bulk collection of foreign records, or records collected outside of the U.S. See, e.g.,
Donohue, Section 702, supra note 23, at 139–53 (explaining that bulk collection methods
can proceed under multiple legal authorities including Section 702 of FISA Amendments
Act and Executive Order 12333); Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1689–90 (2015).
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critical counterterrorism objectives.166 Procedurally, this can occur
through technical compliance with the USA FREEDOM Act. The
intelligence community, under the USA FREEDOM Act, may
request orders from the FISC in a manner that may elicit a volume of
metadata records on par with volumes achieved under Section 215’s
bulk telephony metadata collection program.167 Despite Congress’s
attempts to statutorily curtail bulk metadata collection, intelligence
agencies can still do so by working within and around the procedural
parameters of the USA FREEDOM Act (e.g., the intelligence
community may: delegate bulk metadata collection to other agencies,
contractors, and entities, such as state and local law enforcement;
purchase bulk metadata; negotiate direct access to metadata through

166. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 102, at 773 (describing the expansion of “collect-it-all”
data tools); Granick, supra note 156 (describing how without Fourth Amendment
restrictions, the economics and technology of mass surveillance will encourage the
government to continue”.
167. See Schlanger, supra note 39, at 129 (“[T]he FISA Court now signs off on a
massive program of targeted surveillance of foreigners—including when their
communication is with an American.”). The USA FREEDOM Act was criticized as
potentially ineffective because the Act attempts to eliminate bulk collection through
requiring the NSA to limit its request for data through a “specific selection term”
restriction. See, e.g., H.L. Pohlman, The NSA FREEDOM Act?, WASH. POST (May 27,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/27/the-nsa-freedomact/ [https://perma.cc/3BHW-JYZJ] (“Their first concern, and the one most widely noted,
is with the new definition of the kinds of ‘specific selection terms’ that the National
Security Agency (NSA) could use when applying for court orders for the production of
call detail records from private phone companies. What will NSA be searching for?”).
Under the USA FREEDOM Act, particularly controversial was how to define “specific
selection term” as a requirement for the basis of production of data and as a method to
limit bulk collection of data. See, e.g., Forsyth, supra note 142, at 1335–36. “[T]here was no
aspect of the bill that garnered more intense focus than the definition of specific selection
term. It was primarily this definition that led many technology companies and privacy
groups to pull their support for the USA FREEDOM Act after it first passed the House in
2014.” Id. at 1336. Bart Forsyth, chief of staff to Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner,
explained the controversy this way: “By requiring a specific selection term, the USA
FREEDOM Act therefore, by definition, ended bulk collection. But would this new
limitation be sufficient in practice?” Id. at 1335 (footnote omitted). The USA FREEDOM
Act limits the definition of a “specific selection term” so that it “cannot be used to identify
an ‘electronic service provider’ or a ‘broad geographic area.’” Id. at 1337 (citing USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107(k)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 129 Stat. at 273).
“[T]he key to the new legal standard is that the specific selection term must be ‘used to
limit, to the greatest extent reasonably practicable, the volume of tangible things sought
consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.’” Id. (quoting USA
FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 107(k)(4)(A)(i)(II), 129 Stat. at 274.). “The
[specific selection term] is, therefore, not intended to put a cap on the total amount of
records, but instead, to limit the number of records to the greatest extent possible.” Id. at
1337–38 (citing 161 CONG. REC. S2772 (daily ed. May 12, 2015)).
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cooperative relationships with telecommunications and Internet
providers; etc.).168
Consequently, under the USA FREEDOM Act, it is unclear
whether bulk metadata collection will cease and, thus, whether mass
suspicion-less tracking of metadata by the intelligence community will
continue in an under-regulated manner.
III. POST-USA FREEDOM ACT
Absent any Supreme Court decision addressing the issue, the
government has argued that the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata
program could continue temporarily.169 Immediately after Congress
passed the USA FREEDOM Act and President Barack Obama
signed the Act into law on June 2, 2015, the DOJ filed a motion with
the FISC seeking permission to extend the NSA’s bulk telephony
metadata collection program for an additional 180 days.170 The
motion cited a need to ensure an “orderly transition” from the prior
bulk telephony metadata collection program under Section 215 of the
168. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/us/politics/att-helped-nsaspy-on-an-array-of-internet-traffic.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/9QUZ-MM82
(dark
archive)]; Ryan Deveraux, Glenn Greenwald & Laura Poitras, Data Pirates of the
Caribbean: The NSA is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, INTERCEPT
(May 19, 2014, 12:37 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsarecording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
[https://perma.cc/G6MP-2BF8];
Glenn
Greenwald et al., Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted Messages, GUARDIAN
(July 12, 2013, 3:04 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsacollaboration-user-data [https://perma.cc/4Y4T-8A7K]; Brad Heath, U.S. Secretly Tracked
Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2015, 10:36 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-surveillance-operation
/70808616/ [https://perma.cc/JQ9R-MS2V] (“For more than two decades, the Justice
Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration amassed logs of virtually all
telephone calls from the USA to as many as 116 countries linked to drug trafficking,
current and former officials involved with the operation said”); Jeremy Scahill & Josh
Begley, The Great SIM Heist: How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle,
INTERCEPT (Feb. 19, 2015, 2:25 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
[https://perma.cc/ZPL7-5ZEN]; Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Agreements with
Private Companies Protect U.S. Access to Cables’ Data for Surveillance, WASH. POST (July
6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-privatecompanies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2
-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/3AQA-SWCZ].
169. See Memorandum of Law at 1, In Re Application of the FBI for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562 (FISA Ct. June
29, 2015) (arguing that “Section 1861, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act,
authorizes the [FISA] Court to approve the Government’s application for the bulk
production of call detail records for a 180 day transition period,” and that “such
authorization is appropriate notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s recent panel opinion in
[Clapper]”).
170. Id.
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USA PATRIOT Act, and the Justice Department argued that the
USA FREEDOM Act expressly allows for an extension of bulk
telephony metadata collection for an additional 180 days.171
The key question centers upon what the program now resembles,
given that the USA FREEDOM Act went into effect as of December
1, 2015. Put another way, the question remains whether the NSA has
facilitated an “orderly transition” from the Section 215 bulk
telephony metadata collection program to another similar bulk
telephony metadata collection program that is technically within
compliance with the USA FREEDOM Act.172 As mentioned above,
the Act does not prohibit the delegation of bulk telephony metadata
collection to other agencies and entities; requesting orders from the
FISC in a manner that achieves a similar volume to the prior bulk
metadata collection program; and intensifying metadata collection
under Section 702 of the FAA and Executive Order 12333.173 Shifting
the justification for bulk metadata collection to other legal authorities
allows the NSA and other intelligence organizations to collect in the
absence of order requirements now specified under the USA
FREEDOM Act.
Moreover, the USA FREEDOM Act only speaks to bulk
telephony metadata collection that had previously been justified
under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.174 The Act does not
regulate mass metadata collection generated by emails, Internet
searches and web-browsing history, social media network activities,
and information retained by smart technologies and other electronic
devices, as mentioned above.175 So long as the intelligence community
perceives bulk metadata is needed to support a big data

171. Id. at 5–6 (“Congress recognized the need for an orderly transition period that
preserves an important foreign intelligence collection capability until the Government
may effectively avail itself of the new provisions for a targeted production.”).
172. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
174. See Cole, supra note 101 (“The bill is addressed almost entirely to the NSA’s
domestic surveillance, but the vast majority of the agency’s spying is conducted overseas
and directed at foreigners. Under those programs, which are not touched by the USA
[FREEDOM] Act, the agency has, for example, recorded the contents of every phone call
for a year in some countries; vacuumed up massive amounts of Internet data on wholly
innocent persons; and collected the contents of phone calls, e-mails, and Internet activity
of millions of innocent people. Because these measures are targeted at foreigners, they
don’t generate the same level of concern here as at home. But these programs implicate
our rights, too, as they routinely intercept communications between US citizens and
foreign persons. Even an e-mail from Poughkeepsie to Peoria may be routed through
France or England without our knowing it, and thus be subject to NSA interception.”).
175. See MacAskill, supra note 36.
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cybersurveillance architecture176 that has been built for over a
decade—an architecture that, based upon modest estimates, reflects
an investment of billions of dollars177—the task of bringing bulk
metadata collection under closer oversight is an extraordinarily
difficult one.
It is particularly instructive to point out that in ACLU v.
Clapper,178 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded with a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by the
bulk telephony metadata program, noting that, on this issue, “the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is in some turmoil.”179 But instead of
trying to resolve that turmoil, the Second Circuit rested its decision
on its statutory findings and noted that the legislative branch is
“better positioned than the courts . . . to pass judgment on the value
of the telephone metadata program as a counterterrorism tool.”180
Yet, importantly, in its motion filed with the FISC days after the
passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, the DOJ argued that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opinion in Clapper is not
binding on the FISC.181 The government argued that “[the FISA]
Court’s analysis of Section 215 reflects the better interpretation of the
statute” and called on the court to continue to apply it.182 Only one
judge in one federal court, Judge Leon in the District Court of
Washington, D.C., held that bulk metadata collection posed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.183
The circuit split stems from diametrically opposing views of
whether bulk metadata collection is protected by the Fourth
176. Experts increasingly describe big data surveillance in architectural terms. See, e.g.,
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 48 (2015) (“This has evolved into a shockingly
extensive, robust, and profitable surveillance architecture.”).
177. “[The National Archives, Information Security Oversight Office] has studied how
much the federal government spends just to keep secrets secret. The price tag: $10 billion
a year.” DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 24 (2011). “The budget [for intelligence] had been
estimated to be $75 billion a year, which did not include all the military’s spending on
counterterrorism and intelligence.” Id. at 103.
178. 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
179. Id. at 821–23 (referring to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to, and
including, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)).
180. Id. at 824.
181. Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 7; see also Spencer Ackerman, Obama
Lawyers Asked Secret Court to Ignore Public Court’s Decision on Spying, GUARDIAN
(June 9, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/obama-fisa-courtsurveillance-phone-records [https://perma.cc/7ST9-J7HE].
182. Memorandum of Law, supra note 169, at 7.
183. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d on other grounds,
800 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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Amendment and whether the third-party doctrine controls such
collection. The core of the third-party doctrine, established in Smith v.
Maryland,184 is that an individual lacks a subjective expectation of
privacy in data shared with a third party—which in this case is the
telephone provider.185 In the Southern District of New York, Judge
Pauley determined that the third-party doctrine eliminated the
possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation because customers
shared their telephony metadata with a third party186—Verizon—thus,
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the metadata.187 As
noted above, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Pauley’s decision on
appeal, but only by avoiding the constitutional issue and deciding the
case on statutory grounds.188
Judge Leon chose to confront the constitutional issue, finding
that the third-party doctrine from Smith v. Maryland was not
controlling. Katz v. United States189 requires a two-step analysis:
beginning with the question of whether the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, one then moves to the question of
whether society would ratify that expectation as reasonable.190 Under
this test, an individual seemingly could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the metadata from her telephone because
the data had been shared with a third party, the telephone company;
therefore, the bulk telephony metadata program would not be
unconstitutional. But Judge Leon contended that such a result would
be unreasonable and contrary to the spirit of Katz, arguing that the
technological changes “have resulted in a greater expectation of
privacy and a recognition that society views that expectation as
reasonable.”191 His decision, while bold, ultimately was overturned by
the D.C. Circuit: based on standing concerns, that court vacated the
preliminary injunction that the district court had granted.192

184. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
185. Id. at 743–44.
186. Id.
187. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d
787, 792 (2d Cir. 2015).
188. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s
opinion).
189. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
190. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (clearly outlining the twofold test).
191. Id.
192. Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining that “the facts
marshaled by plaintiffs do not fully establish that their own metadata was ever collected”).
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CONCLUSION
The USA FREEDOM Act is a significant legislative
accomplishment, reflecting an impressive bipartisan effort. The clear
intent of the USA FREEDOM Act is to impose meaningful limits on
bulk metadata collection. The extent to which it will succeed is an
open question, but the law has included important oversight
protections. Because the FISC operates in a shroud of secrecy, the
USA FREEDOM Act is an accomplishment in that it both increases
transparency measures and implements additional accountability
measures. By allowing for the declassification of certain FISC
opinions, the USA FREEDOM Act may increase the chance that the
public can understand how the FISC is interpreting the USA
FREEDOM Act. The USA FREEDOM Act allows for public
reporting by service provider companies, therefore, theoretically,
significant increases in collection may be reported by the private
sector. The USA FREEDOM Act also reflects structural changes to
how the FISC operates. It allows for the appointment of amicus
curiae to represent alternative perspectives to the court. Further,
under the Section 215 program, bulk metadata collection was
authorized by the FISC as a wholesale program, however, queries of
the data were not court-approved. Under the USA FREEDOM Act,
queries now are subject to FISC approval.
The reforms to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
was used to justify the bulk telephony metadata collection program
revealed by the Snowden disclosures, appear to apply to the
government as a whole, not just the NSA; and arguably, the text of
the law on its face could be read to apply to the collection of all
records—not just metadata or even telephony metadata. The law also
attempts to limit potential bulk collection under the Pen Register, or
Trap and Trace, authority and national security letters.193
Yet, bulk metadata collection is largely under-regulated by the
current federal legislative scheme governing U.S. surveillance
activities. The USA FREEDOM Act’s “specific selection term”

193. See ODNI Announces Transition to New Telephone Metadata Program, OFFICE
DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 27, 2015), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post
/134069716908/odni-announces-transition-to-new-telephone
[https://perma.cc/KWL3L2LC] (explaining how “[t]he Act . . . banned bulk collection under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, under the pen register and trap and trace provisions found in Title
IV of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), or pursuant to National Security
Letters”).
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requirement could be interpreted broadly;194 the definition of a query
could be expanded;195 “incidental” collection could still sweep in
metadata collection in bulk;196 and limiting the collection to two
“hops” means potentially millions of “call detail records” can still be
collected under the Act.197 U.S. federal courts appear to be conflicted
about how to treat metadata collection under the federal scheme that
is intended to subject it to proper oversight. Moreover, it is unclear
how metadata surveillance falls within the preexisting Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence of the U.S. Constitution. In implementing
the USA FREEDOM Act, the FISC has declined to follow, for
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s opinion
in Clapper, and suggested that it is awaiting resolution of the issue of
the constitutionality of metadata surveillance by the Supreme
Court.198
194. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 153 (“[T]he specific selection term is the basis for
the query that the government uses when it collects records. A broad selection term
(‘People in California’ or ‘People with Verizon phones’) would mean massive record
collection, but carefully constructed and defined specific selection terms would strictly
limit the collection.”).
195. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein, The FBI’s Warrantless Surveillance Back Door Just
Opened a Little Wider, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/30699
/fbis-warrantless-surveillance-door-opened-wider/ [https://perma.cc/2A4V-M74R].
196. See, e.g., Faiza Patel, Bulk Collection Under Section 215 Has Ended . . . What’s
Next?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27996/bulk-collectionended-whats-next/
[https://perma.cc/ABQ5-LKF9];
Patrick
Toomey,
Obama
Administration Embraced Legal Theories Broader Than John Yoo’s, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/30460/obama-administration-embraced-legaltheories-broader-john-yoos/ [https://perma.cc/VG7F-76Z6].
197. See, e.g., supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
198. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things, No. BR 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *7 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (stating that the
Second Circuit’s ruling is not binding on the FISC; Order declining to follow Second
Circuit approach).
The Court is aware that, prior to enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act, the
Second Circuit in Clapper rejected the government’s arguments that the call detail
records acquired under the NSA program were relevant to an authorized
investigation other than a threat assessment as required by section 501(b)(2)(A)
and (c)(1) of FISA. However, Second Circuit rulings are not binding on the FISC,
and this Court respectfully disagrees with that Court’s analysis, especially in view
of the intervening enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act. As Judge Eagan
stated: “Taken together, the [section 501] provisions are designed to permit the
government wide latitude to seek the information it needs to meet its national
security responsibilities, but only in combination with specific procedures for the
protection of U.S. person information that are tailored to the production and with
an opportunity for the authorization to be challenged.
Id. at *15 (alteration in original). On June 5, 2017, the Court granted certiorari in
Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). See Carpenter v. United States,
No. 16-402, 2017 WL 2407484 (U.S. June 5, 2017). In Carpenter, the Court will decide
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Finally, there is no conclusive evidence thus far that bulk
metadata collection—bulk telephony or non-telephony metadata such
as bulk biometric data collection or bulk biometric metadata
collection—is efficacious.199 Consequently, an assessment of the
efficacy of these rapidly emerging metadata collection methods
should become integral to any future statutory reform, and future
oversight and compliance reform efforts.200 Efficacy determinations
can also serve an important role in an evolution of the constitutional
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.201 Even with passage of the
USA FREEDOM Act, metadata surveillance is likely to continue to
proceed under-regulated until the courts resolve the constitutionality
of newly emerging methods of metadata surveillance and bulk
metadata collection. Consequently, the cybersurveillance potential of
smart body cameras or smart glasses worn by law enforcement offers
and important case study for understanding how the USA
FREEDOM Act is unable to regulate bulk biometric data collection
of bulk biometric metadata collection.

“[w]hether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the
location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by
the Fourth Amendment.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10–11, Carpenter, 819 F.3d
880 (No. 16-402).
199. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 39, at 11 (“Based
on the information provided to the Board, including classified briefings and
documentation, we have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United
States in which the program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a
counterterrorism investigation.”).
200. See generally Hu, supra note 102, at 786 (explaining why a scientific critique “may
aid in assessing the efficacy of big data-driven national security policymaking”).
201. See id. at 808–16 (analyzing relevant case law and explaining how better
understanding the efficacy of these programs may affect Fourth Amendment concerns in
this area).

